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SUPREME

COURT

CRANFORD vs. DRESSLER

No. 9.
Tori-Assault and Battery by ShootingTrespass-Charavari - Proximate Cause Codition-Instructions-Damages-Rule of
Proof.
1. Where, at a charavari of newly-weds,
the wife, with the knowledge and at the
direction of the husband, shot and injured
the plaintiff, both husband and wife are
liable in damages, although the plaintiff
was at the time a trespasser on the premises
and engaged in such unlawful charavari.
2. An answer or plea of charavari and
trespass in such case is bad on demurrer,
for such facts are not sufficient in themselves to constitute a defence to the action.
To be good as a bar to liability it must appear from such pleading that the unlawful
charavari and trespass contributed proximately to cause the plaintiff's injury. In
this case they constituted a mere condition
which does not preclude recovery.
3. An unlawful charavari and trespass
on premises for that purpose do not, of
themselves, justify the use of a deadly
weapon, although reasonable force may be
used to eject a trespasses. And an instruction to that effect is not erroneous where
there is evidence of such trespass and the
shooting of the trespasser.
4. Nor is such instruction made erroneous merely because the defendants have
not specifically plead such trespass as a
defence, for they cannot by their pleadings
limit the theories of plaintiff's right of recovery, nor deprive plaintiff of any instruction that is reasonably applicable to the
evidence of the case solely from the viewpoint of plaintiff's right of recovery.
5. Such instruction is not erroneous on
the alleged ground that it nullifies an instruction given at defendants' request that
"if the jury believe that the force used by
(defendant) Nellie Cranford was such as in
view of all the surrounding circumstances
reasonably appeared to her to be necessary" to prevent plaintiff's wrongful entry
into her home, they should find for the defendants.
The two instructions are consistent, one applying to the plaintiff's
theory of recovery as a tres~lasser, the
other to the defendants' theory of bar of
recovery because of plaintiff's unlawful attempt to enter her home.
6. To warrant the recovery of compensatory damages for alleged loss of time and
decreased capacity to labor, the injured
party must prove the value of such items,
or facts on which an estfnlate of such value
can be founded. Ad an instruction that
the jury may award such damages is not
erroneous if there is evidence in the case
from which the jury may reasonably find
the alue of such lo-,t time and decreased
capacity to labor.

Action in tort for $1000 damages
for assault and battery by shooting
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DAME

brought against Walter Cranford and
Nellie Cranford, husband and wife,
by Charles Dressier. From a judgment of $1000 for plaintiff the defendants appeal. Affirmed.
James L. O'Toole and Joseph Rafter for Appellants.
Alden J. Cusick and Archibald M.
Duncan for Appellee.
VURPILLAT, J. The appellants,
Nellie Cranford and Walter Cranford, were married and were celebrating their honeymoon at the home
of the bride's father, Andrew Rater.
On the eening of August 1, 1919, the
plaintiff and many neighbors of the
newly-weds gathered about the Rater
home for a charavari. While the
serenade was at its height the appellee, plaintiff, was shot, and for the
injuries sustained he brought action
against the newly-married couple.
By the amended complaint it is alleged that on August 1, 1919, the defendant, Nellie Cranford, in the presence and with the express consent
and direction of her husband, Walter
Cranford, did unlawfully, purposely
assault and batter the plaintiff by
aiming and shooting at plaintiff with
a gun loaded with gun powder and
leaden shot, said shot hitting plaintiff
in tl'e right arm, breaking and badly
lacerating the hand and forearm, by
reason of which the plaintiff continued sick, sore and disabled for two
months, all the time suffering great
pain; that he is permanently injured
in this, that his hand and fore-arm
are left stiff and inflexible to a degree
making use of them difficult and awkward and greatly impairing his activity as a working farmer; that he
was compelled to pay $400 for surgical attendance and nursing, for all of
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which he is damaged to the extent of
$1000.
The defendants answer in four
paragraphs: first, general denial;
2nd, self-defense; 3rd, assault was
committed to prevent the forcible
entry of plaintiff into their home;
and 4th, that plaintiff and divers
other persons acting in concert came
upon defendants' premises and conducted themselves in a loud, boisterous and unlawful manner, fired guns,
beat on tins and pans, and made other
bedlam
noises,
shouted
threats
against defendants and conducted a
charavari against them, and refused
to desist from the said unlawful acts
although ordered and requested to do
so; that the assault was committed to
cause plaintiff to desist from the said
unlawful acts and to depart from the
premises.
Although this fourth paragraph of
answer is not challenged by demurrer
its sufficiency is clearly raised by the
assignment of error that the verdict
is contrary to law. For, if the facts
here plead, namely, that there was an
unlawful charavari and that the assault was committed to cause the
plaintiff to desist theiefrom and to
leave the premises, are sufficient in
law to bar plaintiff's recovery, than
the verdict for the plaintiff is contrary to law, because these facts are
firmly established by the record,indeed they are not controverted by
the plaintiff.
But the verdict is not contrary to
law, for the reason that the fourth
paragraph of answer does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a defence
in bar to the plaintiff's action. On
this point the case of Schultz vs.
Paul, reported in the April number,
1920, page 10, of the Notre Dame
Law Reporter, is decisive. This was
an action for damages for personal

injuries caused by an assault and battery by the plaintiff. The complaint
was attacked on the ground that
"facts are alleged which constitute
plaintiff a trespasser, etc." Speaking
to this point the Supreme Court of
Nptre Dame says: "But, assuming
that facts are alleged in complaint
which establish illegal conduct of
plaintiff himself, it must appear that
such illegal conduct was the proximate or contributing cause of the injury complained of. Hall vs. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251, 9 Am. Rep. 30;
Koepkae vs. Pepper, 155 Iowa 687,
136 N. W. 902, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
773; Gilmore vs. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130,
65 N. E. 84, 60 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326.
In Hall vs. Corcoran, supra, it was
said by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts: 'Whether the form of action is in contract or tort, the .test in
each case is whether, when all the
facts are disclosed, the action appears
to be founded in a violation of law in
which the plaintiff has taken part.'
Thus, where the plaintiff and defendant participated in a charavari
party made illegal by the criminal
code of Illinois, the plaintiff was shot
and seriously injured by reason of
the alleged carelessness of the defendant, it was held as a matter of
law that plaintiff had no right of
action. Gilmore vs. Fuller, supra.
See also Higgens vs. Minaghan, 78
Wis. 602, 47 N. W. 941, 11 L. R. A.
138, 23 Am. St. Rep. 428. Where the
parties are in pari delicto, that is, in
equal fault, neither is in a position to
ask relief of the court from a situation caused by his own wrong doing,
whether it be his illegal contract or
his tortious act. Anson on Contracts
(4th Ed.) 262; Chapin on Torts 237;
Hall vs. Corcoran, supra. But where
the illegal conduct of the plaintiff,
whether participated in by the de-
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fendant or not, is not itself the proximate contributing cause of the injury
inflicted upon plaintiff by defendant,
the plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding such illegal conduct." In
further support of this doctrine the
court, in Schultz vs. Paul, cites the
following cases: Welch vs. Wesson, 6
Gray (Mass.) 505; Newcomb vs.
Boston Protective Dept., 146 Mass.
596 (604), 16 N. E. 555, 4 Am. St.
Rep. 354.
The unlawful conduct charged
against plaintiff in appellants' 4th
paragraph of answer did not directly
or proximately contribute to eause
the injury complained of by plaintiff,
but constituted a mere condition or
attendant circumstance to the shooting of plaintiff by appellants. Such a
condition, even if plaintiff himself
was responsible for it, does not preclude his recovery in this action.
Chapin on Torts, 101.
The same reasoning and authorities, in large measure, dispose of another of appellants' assigned errors,
namely: "giving the jury instruction
No. 1 requested by the plaintiff,
which instruction was as follows:
'The jury is instructed that though
reasonable force may be used to eject
a trespasser, the use of a dangerous
weapon is not justified in repelling a
trespass, whether such trespass could
or could not have been prevented.'"
This instruction is correct as stating
an abstract proposition of law, and it
is applicable to the facts of plaintiff's
case as disclosed by the evidence.
Schriber vs. Beach, 4 Denio (N. Y.)
448, 47 Am. Dec. 265; Everton vs.
Esgate, 24 Neb. 235, 38 N. W. 794;
State vs. Montgomery, 65 Iowa 484,
22 N. W. 639; Duke vs. State, 11 Ind.
557. Plaintiff is entitled to recover
even if at the time of the alleged
wrongful shooting by the appellants,

he was himself unlawfully upon appellants' premises as a trespasser;
for the same reason, as we have seen,
that he is entitled to recover notwithstanding the unlawful charavari he
was at the time engaged in; for
neither of these unlawful acts of
plaintiff justified the commission of
the unlawful shooting charged to
appellants. In short, two wrongs do
not make a right. See Schultz vs.
Paul, supra. And since the facts in
evidence disclose that plaintiff was,
at the time of the wrong and injury
complained of, a trespasser, it was
essential to an intelligent determination of the case by the jury that they
be instructed in the law of trespass
as it affected the rights and liabilities
of both parties to the case, plaintiff
as well as defendants.
Directly involved in plaintiff's case
were the issues of law whether, as a
trespasser, he could recover at all, or
whether, as such trespasser, he could
recover if defendants used unreasonable or unnecessary force to repel his
trespass, or used a deadly and dangerous weapon to repel such'trespass.
Since the law is that in either of these
cases plaintiff may recover, and since
the evidence is that plaintiff was a
trespasser and that defendants used a
dangerous weapon and shot plaintiff,
and since the jury's verdict must be
based on the law and the evidence, it
was the court's duty to instruct the
jury as he did, whether upon request
of plaintiff or of his own motion.
The instruction tendered and given
was in support of plaintiff's affirmative right of recovery in view of the
evidence affecting him as a trespasser; and in this view he was entitled to such instruction.
It matters not "that this theory
(trespass) was not set up or relied
upon by the defendants below", as
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complained in appellants' brief; for
the defendants cannot by their pleading limit the theories of right of recovery which plaintiff may have
under the law and the evidence. Nor
can they justly complain of any correct instruction upon the law supporting any theory upon which plaintiff may recover on his own pleadings
and the evidence in the case. If, as
we are led to infer, appellants contend that the instruction complained
of is erroneous simply because it does
not conform to the issues as tendered
by them alone, they are in error; for
both parties are entitled to such instructions, in view of their own
pleadings and the -evidence, as tend to
sustain their respective theories of
right of recovery or bar to recovery.
I Blashfield on Instructions, Sec. 145.
Thus defendants sought to avoid
liability for the alleged shooting on
the theory advanced in their third
paragraph of answer that they deemed the shooting reasonably necessary
to prevent plaintiff's wrongful entry
into their dwelling house; and, although plaintiff by general denial
controverted the existence of such
facts, the trial court, at defendants'
request, gave to the jury the following instruction: "The court instructs
the jury that a person is entitled to
use reasonable force to prevent a
wrongful aggressor from entering
the dwelling house occupied by the
former. If you find that the defendant, Nellie Cranford, assaulted
the plaintiff while he was engaged in
attempting to wrongfully enter the
dwelling house occupied by her, you
shall find for the defendants, providing you believe that the force used by
her was such as in view of all the
surrounding circumstances reasonably appeared to her to be necessary." "This instruction," as appel-

lants say, "correctly stated the law
applicable to the theory plead," and
we may add, was therefore given by
the court. Had the jury found the
facts to be as here assumed by appellants, then the jury would have applied the law as stated in this instruction, and their verdict would have
been for appellants. But the plaintiff
replied by general denial to the plea,
as also to the pea of self-defence, and
in support of such denial had a right
to maintain that the evidence in the
case did not establish the facts alleged by appellants in their pleas,that they did the shooting complained
of to prevent the plaintiff from entering their home or in self-defence.
The plaintiff's theory of right of
recovery, as based on his complaint
and denials to defendants' pleas, was
that the shooting by the appellants
was unlawful, that it was not justified as alleged by appellants, and that
he was therefore entitled to recover
from defendants in the action, even
if the jury should find that he was a
trespasser upon the appellants' premises at the time, for, as stated by the
court in the instruction complained
of, "though reasonable force may be
used to eject a trespasser, the use of
a dangerous weapon is not justified in
repelling a trespass, whether such
trespass could or could not have been
prevented." The jury, having found
the facts for the plaintiff, was required to apply the law applicable to
such facts. The instruction, which is
admitted by appellants to be a correct
statement of the law, was therefore
necessary as well as applicable to the
facts as found by the jury. There
was no error in giving this instruction. Indeed, it would have been reversible error to have rejected an instruction so obviously applicable to
the issues arising from the pleadings
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as well as the evidence in the case.
St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co. vs. First
National Bank of Chicago, Nov.,
1920, N. D. Law Rep., page 15; Bank
of Metropolis vs. New England Bank,
I Howard 234, II L. Ed. 234.
We may not pass this point without noting another objection raised
to the instruction in question. Appellants cmoplain that, though the court
instructed the jury to find for them
providing they believed that the force
used by Nellie Cranford was such as
in view of all the surrounding circumstances reasonably appeared to
her to be necessary to prevent plaintiff from entering her home, yet, "in
the instruction to which exception is
taken, the jury was told that the use
of a dangerous weapon can never be
considered as reasonable force." No
such statement appears in the instruction complained of. By this misstatement of the letter as well as the
spirit of that instruction, appellants
seek to make it appear that such instruction nullifies the Qther instruction given at their request. This attempt to discredit the trial court's
instructions has not even the merit
of ingeniousness, for it is a resort to
a palpable distortion of one of the
court's instructions, admitted to be
correct as applied to the theory of
force that may be used against a
trespasser, to be misapplied to the
instruction upon the theory of such
force as may seem reasonably necessary to one seeking to prevent another's wrongful entry into his home.
Both instructions are correct statements of the law; both are equally
applicable to the facts in evidence as
the jury might find them; they relate
to entirely different legal propositions, applicable to entirely different
states of facts; are neither inconsistent nor related in themselves, and

are so necessary to the issues raised
by the pleadings and the evidence
that to have refused either of them
would have constituted reversible
error. Parker vs. State, 136 Ind.
284, 35 N. E. 1105; Spaulding vs.
Adams, 63 Iowa 437, 19 N. W. 341;
Tupper vs. Houston, 46 Wis. 646, I
N. W. 332; O'Callaghan vs. Bbeing,
72 Mich. 669, 40 N. W. 843; Pa. Ry.
Co. vs. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 18; Lytle vs.
Boyer, 33 Ohio St. 506.
Appellants assign that the verdict
of the jury is excessive, and, assuming that exemplary damages were
awarded by the jury, counsel present
a noteworthy argument against the
recovery of exemplary (punitive or
vindictive) damages for a tortious
wrong which also constitutes an indictable offense. There are but few
states in which this rule operates as
an absolute bar to the recovery of
exemplary damages in actions for
tort. Austin vs. Wilson, 4 Cush.
(Mass.) 273, 50 Am. Dec. 766; Lucas
vs. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co., 98 Mich. 1,
39 Am. St. Rep. 517; Boyer vs. Barr,
8 Neb. 68, 30 Am. Rep. 814; Fay vs.
Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 16 Am. Rep.
270; Spokane Truck Co. vs. Hofer, 2
Wash. 45, 26 Am. St. Rep. 842. But
even in these jurisdictions facts in
aggravation of the wrong done are
permitted to heighten the damages recoverable for mental suffering. Raynor vs. Nims, 37 Mich. 34, 26 Am.
Rep. 493; Bixby vs. Dunlep, 56 N. H.
456, 22 Am. Rep. 475.
Despite the rule against punitive
damages laid down in the case of
Tabor vs. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 61 Am.
Dec. 96, where nothing more appears
than the fact that the wrong complained of is also an indictable offense, the true rule in Indiana, as in
England, the United States and
nearly all the states, "is that where
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malice, fraud, or gross negligence or
recklessness enters into commis'ion
of a tort exemplary damages are recoverable." 12 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law 13; Binford vs. Young, 115 Ind.
174, 16 N. E. 142; Citizens St. Ry.
Co. vs. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563, 33 N.
E. 627; Moore vs. Crose, 43 Ind. 30;
Ziegler vs. Powell, 54 Ind. 173. Counsel for appellee are therefore greviously in error in their stated deduction that "Indiana law is fundamentally unsound, and contrary to the
overyhelming weight of American
overwhelming weight of American
authority. In Indiana the recovery of
exemplary damages may be had
where matters in aggravation of
the wrong are plead and proven which particularly affect the
And this, we subinpured party.
generally obtaining, for there has
never been any just reason assigned
for inflicting double punishment for
an offence committed, one at the
hands of the state, and the other to
enure to the benefit of a private citizen who is no more affected by the
commission of the crime than the
general public, except for actual damages sustained for which he is fully
compensated in the civil action.
In Pennsylvania it is held that conviction of crime may be shown in
mitigation, but not in bar, of exemplary damages for tort. Wirsing vs.
Smith, 222 Pa. 8, 70 Atl. 906; Rhodes
vs. Rodgers, 151 Pa. St. 634, 24 Atl.
1041. The weight of authority, however is that the indictable character
of the offence operates neither to bar
nor mitigate the exemplary damages
recoverable for the tort. Bauer on
Damages 121; I Sedgwick on Damages, Sec 38; 12 Am. and Eng. Encyc.
if Law 8. Nor is this unconstitutional as putting one twice in jeopardy
for the same offence. Brown vs.

Evans, 8 Sawy. (U. S.) 492; Brown
vs. Swinford, 44 Wis. 287, 28 Am.
Rep. 582; Charles vs. D'rake, 2 Metcf.
(Ky.) 171, 74 Am. Dec. 406.
However, in appellant's case there
s no warrant for the assumption that
the verdict includes exemplary damages. No facts in aggravation are
plead, and no demand for such damages was made. That no such damages were awarded is conclusively established by the trial court's instruction which contains no direction to
the jury as to the element of exemplary damages. It is obvious, therefore, that the verdict is not excessive
as containing exemplary damages. It
is not argued that it is otherwise excessive. That the verdict is not excessive may be seen from an examination of the following cases of personal injuries to farmers: Ballon vs.
Mo. P. Ry. Co., 172 Mo. 92, 72 S. W.
530; Meacles vs. Doun, 64 Wis. 323,
25 N. W. 412; Galveston Ry. Co., vs.
Eaton (Tex.) 44 S. W. 562; C. R. I.
R.R. Co vs. Burns (Tex) 104 S. W.
1081; Gale vs. N. Y. Ry. Co., 76 N.Y.
594; Play vs. Sonnette, 169 Ill. App.
494.
Appellants complain of the trial
court's instruction on the measure of
damages which is as follows: "The
court instructs the jury that if you
find for the plaintiff * * * you will
allow such damages as seem to you to
be right and proper under all the
facts and circumstances in evidence,
not exceeding $1,000 the amount asked. In estimating the damages, you
have a right to consider bodily and
mental pain, if any, endured by the
plaintiff, loss of time caused by the
assault, and his diminished capacity
for labor resulting directly from the
defendant's wrongful acts. You may
also take into consideration the surgical bills, if any. It is not necessary
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that the amount of damages resulting from personal injuries should be
actually proved by witnesses, but it is
to be determined by you from your
own knowledge and experience as applied to the facts and conditions established by the evidence." In reference to the elements of damage alleged in the complaint and mentioned
in the court's instruction, appellee,
says: "Here (plaintiff) is setting up
four items on which he asks compensation, to-wit: loss of time, pain and
suffering, decreased capacity for labor, and $400 paid out for surgical
attendance and nursing. It is not the
eontention of the appellants that an
assault and battery does not entitle
plaintiff to recover on any and all of
these items. But it is necessary for
him not only to specify in what respects he was damaged but also to
prove with reasonable certainty the
existence and extent of the damage."
In effect appellant's contention is that
the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that if they found for plaintiff they might assess damages for
loss of time and decreased capacity
for labor, because "plaintiff has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to
allow the jury to award any damages
on (these items)." This objection resolves itself into a question of fact
rather than one of law. If there was
no evidence at all to sustain an award
upon any item of damages sought, the
court should not have instructed the
jury that damages for such item
might be assessed. If, however, there
was any evidence upon which the
jury might reasonably have estimated such damages, it would have been
error for the court not to have given
the instruction. Appellants cite 8
Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd
Ed.) 557 as authority for their statement that "Where loss of time is

claimed as an item of damage for a
personal injury, if the plaintiff fail
to prove the value of the time lost
only nominal damages can be recovered." The rule as actually stated by
that authority is "Where loss of time
is claimed as an item of damages for
personal injury occasioned by negligence, if plaintiff fails to prove the
value of the time lost, or facts on
which an estimate of such value can
be founded, only nominal damages
for that item can be given." It is not
therefore necessary in every case to
prove in dollars and cents the actual
value of the time lost in order to recover damages therefor. Indeed,
there are many cases in which this is
practically impossible, and appellee's
case is of that character. "Mere impossibility," says a modern text
writer, "of computing damages with
the utmost accuracy does not prevent
the recovery of substantial damages;
if either party is to be placed at a disadvantage by reason of such impossibility, it should be the defendant,
whose wrongful conduct has rendered
the inquiry as to damages necessary."
Bauer on Damages 73; Welch vs.
Ware, 32 Mich. 77; Browning vs.
Jones 52 Ill. App. 597. "It is true,"
says the Court of Appeals of Missouri, "that there was no specific evidence as to the value of time lost, nor
was it necessary." Gerdes vs. Foundry Co. (Mo.) 25 S. W. 557. The rule
is that facts on which an estimate of
such value can be founded are sufficient to sustain an award of damages
for time lost. In appellants' chse
there is ample evidence on which to
base the estimate of the value of the
time proven to have been lost, as well
as of the value of the decreased capacity to labor. Appellee was thirtyfive years of age, a farmer of moderate means, working for himself, de-
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pendent upon his own farm labor for
a livelihood for himself and family of
wife and three small children. He
was shot on August 1st, 1919, and
was confined to the hospital during
August and September, and prevented from carrying on his usual avocation and was forced to lose whatever
of value his work on his own farm
might have been to him at that time
of year. Less evidence than this was
held sufficient to justify submitting
to the jury the question of damages
for the loss of time to a farmer working his own farm, in the case of Mayberry vs. Cape G. & J. Gravel R. Co.
(Mo.) 69 S. W. 394. It is said by the
court in the case of Railroad Co. vs.
Borm, 72 U. S. 90, that "the damages
in these cases
- * must depend
very much on the good sense and
sound judgment of the jury upon all
the facts and circumstances of the
particular case." And so to the same
effect is the language of the court in
the case of Harmon vs. Old C. Ry. Co.
168 Mass. 337, 47 N. E. 100.
The evidence also warrants the assessment of damages on account of
the decreased capacity to labor. By
the shooting appellee's right arm was
broken, the fore-arm and hand lacerated and shattered, as a result of
which he is permanently injured to
the extent that his arm and hand are
stiff and inflexible, making their use
difficult and gretly hampering his
activity as a working farmer. The
evidence discloses that the appellee
was unable to work and did not work
en his farm from the time of the injury to the day of trial. In this case
is the value of the decreased capacity
to labor also impossible of actual
proof, and again the rule for determining such. damage must be the estimate of such value to be based by the
jury upon the particular facts and

circumstances proven. To the appellee's case may well be applied the language of the court in the case of
Petrie vs. The Ry Co. (S. C.) 7 S. E.
515: "There are certain employments
so extensively followed and so intimately blended with the customary
life of our people and within everyone's experience that the law wisely
declines to exact specific proof of
them, deeming it expedient to trust
rather to the general source of information which all men have access to,
since exact proof is unobtainable in
any event."
Appellants rely on the cases of
Leeds vs. Metropolitan Gas Light Co.
90 N. Y. 26, and Stahl vs. Grand St.
N. R. Co., 107 N. Y. 625, 13 N. E. 624.
That neither of these cases bears any
analogy to appellant's case nor lends
any support to their contention clearly appears from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals in the latter case.
The court says: "There was proof
that the plaintiff was a fresco painter, and that for some time before his
injuries he had been employed by a
person who was engaged in the business of painting. No special damages, and no pecuniary losses past or
future, were alleged in the complaint.
There was no proof whatever as to
plaintiff's circumstances in life, except that before the injury his 'general health was good.' There was no
proof touching his age, habits, capacity, ability to work, skill in his
trade, his wages or his earnings, or
the compensation he was able to earn,
or his chances of getting work. There
was not even any proof that he was
able to earn a livelihood." The trial
court, though recognizing the rule
laid down in the case of Leeds vs Gas
Light Co. 90 N. Y. 26, erroneously instructed the jury that damages might
be awarded for future loss of time.
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Continuing the Court of Appeals
says: "This charge was clearly in
conflict with the rule laid down in the
case cited. In that case we held that
where loss of time is claimed as an
item of damages in such a case as this
if plaintiff fails to prove the value of
the time lost, or facts on which an
estimate of such value can be founded
only nominal damages can be given.
There it was proved that the plaintiff
was engaged in business at the time
of the injury, and that he had not
been able to attend to his business
since, but it was not shown what his
business was, or the value of his
time, or any facts as to his occupation from which the value could be
estimated."
In both these cases there was such
an utter lack of proof not only as to
the value of the time lost, but also as
to facts upon which to base an estimate of that value, that it was erroneous to instruct that damages
might be awarded at all. In the case
of People ex. rel. vs. Mus. Mut. Protective Union, 118 N. Y. 101, 23 N.
E. 129, also citey by appellants, the
Court of Appeals itself clearly disnguishes the Leeds vs. Gas Light
Co. case. In this case the jury's
award of damages for lost time was
sustained in these words; "There was
evidence upon which to base their
estimate,and the question in this re-

spect differed from that of Leeds vs.
Gas Light Co., 90 N. Y. 26. The appellant's case also differs from the
Leeds case in this respect. Of the
other two cases cited by appellants,
the case of Manistee vs. Hodley, 165
Ala. 211, 51 So. 871 is also one in
which there was no evidence on which
to base an estimate of the value of
damages; and Railroad vs. Minogue
(Ky. 12 S. W. 357 merely decides
that the verdict of $10,000 is excessive for the permanent injuries that
were actually proven.
There was no error in giving the
instruction as to the elements of damage to be awarded by the jury in appellants' case, for there appears sufficient evidence in the record upon
which the jury might reasonably
have estimated the value of the damages for appellee's loss of time, and
his incapacity to labor at least to the
time of trial; and the assessments of
damages for these elements, together
with that for $400 actually expended
for surgical aid, and that for the pain
and suffering endured, might well
have exceeded $1,000, the amount of
the verdict, to say nothing of the
damages for the permanent character of the plaintiff's injuries.
Finding no error in the record, the
trial court's judgment is in all things
affirmed.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER

BRIEF OF JAMES L. O'TOOLE IN CASE OF
CRANFORD vs. DRESSLER.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
Nellie Cranford and Walter Cranford
Appellants,
VS.
Charles Dressier,
Appellee.
Brief for Appellants.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This was an action for damages
for personal injuries resulting from
an alleged assault and battery committed on Charles Dressier, the plaintiff below, by Nellie Cranford, "in the
presence and with the express consent and direction of her husband,
Walter Cranford," the co-defendant
below.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The complaint was in one paragraph, alleging that at three o'clock
on the afternoon of August 1st, 1919,
the defendant, Nellie Cranford, in the
presence and with the express consent and direction of her husband,
Walter Cranford, did then and there
unlawfully, wilfully, and purposely
assault and batter the said plaintiff,
doing him great bodily harm; that
she commited said assault and battery by then and there unlawfully,
willfully, and purposely aiming and
shooting at said plaintiff with a certain gun, then and there loaded with
gun powder and leaden shot, said
shot hitting plaintiff in the right
fore-arm, breaking the arm and badly lacerating the hand and fore-arm
and by reason of all of which the
plaintiff continued sick, sore and disabled for two months during all fo
which time he suffered great pain;
that he is permanently injured in
this, that his hand and fore-arm are

left stiff and inflexible to a degree
making use of them difficult and awkward and greatly hampering "his activity as a working farmer; that he
was compelled to pay and did pay out
$400 for surgical attendance and
nursing for all of which he is damaged to the amount of $1,000. The
defendant's answer was in four paragraphs; general denial, self-denial,
prevention of a wrongful and forseful entry of the dwelling house occupied by the defendants, and that the
plaintiff, together with divers other
persons acting in concert, came upon
and about the premises occupied by
the defendants and conducted themselves in a loud, boisterous, and unlawful manner, fired guns, beat on
tins and pans, and made other bedlam
noises, shouted threats against the
defendants and conducted a charavari against them and refused to desist from these unlawful acts although ordered and requested to do
so, that the assault was committed to
cause the plaintiff to desist from the
said unlawful acts and to depart from
the premises. The plaintiff filed a
general denial to the second, third
and fuorth paragraphs of answer.
Trial was had by jury and a verdict
for $1,000 was reutrned for the plaintiff and against both defendants. The
defendants filed a motion for a new
trial, which motion was over-ruled.
against
Judgment being entered
them, they take this appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. The verdict of the jury is excessive.
2. The verdict of the jury is not
sustained by sufficient evidence.
3. The verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence.
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4. The court erred in giving the
jury instruction No. 5, requested by
the plaintiff, which instruction was
as follows: "The court instructs the
jury that if you find for the plaintiff
under the instructions heretofore
given, you will allow such damages as
seem t oyou to be right and proper
under all the facts and circumstances
in veidence, not exceeding $1,000, the
amount asked. In estimating the
damages you have a right consider
bodily and mental pain, if any, endured by the plaintiff, loss of time
caused by the assault, and his diminished capacity for labor resulting
directly from the defendants' wrongful acts. You may also take into consideration the surgical bills, if any.
It is not necessary that the amount
of damages resulting from personal
injuries should be proved by witnes-es, but it is to be determined by you
from your own knowledge and experience as applied to the facts and
conditions established by the evidence."
5. The court erred in giving the
jury instruction No. 1, requested by
the plaintiff, which instruction was
as follows: "The jury is instructed
that though reasonable force may be
used to eject a tresspasser, the use
of a dangerous weapon is not justified in repelling a tresspass, whether
such tresspass could or could not have
been prevented."
6. The court erred in over-ruling
defendant's motion for a new trial.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. The plaintiff can recover, if at
all, only. compensatory damages, exemplary damages not being allowable
for a tortious wrong which also constitutes an indictable offense. Taber
vs. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322; Humphrey vs
Johnson, 20 Ind. 190; Struble vs.

Nodwife 11 Ind. 64; Butler vs. Mercer, 14 Ind. 479; Nosman vs. Rickert
18 Ind. 350; Stewart vs. Maddox, 63
Ind. 51; Farman vs. Lauman, 73 Ind.
568; Boyer vs. Barr (Neb.) 30 Am.
Rep. 814; Fay vs. Parker, N. H. 16
Am. Rep. 270; Taylor vs. Carpenter,
2 Woodb. & M. 22; Huber Vxs. Tueber,
3 McArth. 484; Koerner Vs. Oberly,
52 Ind. 284; Shaefer vs. Smith, 63
Ind. 226; Murphy vs. Hobbs, 7 Colo.
541, 5 Pac. 119; State vs. Stephens,
108 Ind. 55; Louisville, etc., R. Co. vs
Wolfe, 128 Ind. 347; Austin vs. Wilson, 4 Cush. 273 ;Whitney vs. Hitchcock, 4 Denio. 461.
2. To warrant substantial damages, evidence must be given where
the subject matter is from its nature
capbale of proof. The value of ones
time is capable of such proof, and in
the absence of such proof the jury
may. not consider the loss of time as
an item for which compensation can
be given. Leeds vs. Metropolitan
Gas Light Co., 90 N. Y. 26; Mitchell
vs. Hudson River R. Co. 2 Hun. 535;
Owen vs, O'Rielly, 20 Mo. 603; Brantingham vs. Fay, 1 Johns Cas. 255;
Lienan vs. Dinsmore, 3 Daly 365;
Allen vs. Suydam, 20 Wend. 327;
Bersiegel vs. N. Y. C. R.R. Co. 40 N.
Y. 10; McIntyre vs. N. Y. C. R.R. Co.
37 N. Y. 287; Walker vs. trie R. Co.
63 Barb. 260; Wade vs. LeRoy, 20
How. 34; Nebraska City vs. Campbell, 2 Black, 590; Masterson vs. Mt.
Vernon, 58 N. Y. 590.
3. If the court erred in charging
that the plaintiff could recover for
the value of his time where no value
was proved, the judgment must be
reversed, no matter how much evidence may be upon other points to
sustain it, for this court is unable to
estimate how much damage the jury
awarded for this item. Staal vs.
Grand Street & N. R. Co. 13 N. E.;
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Sperly vs. Miller, 16 N. Y. 407; Van- Nellie Cranford. The plaintiff himself testified that he spent two months
derslice vs. Newton, 4 Id. 130.
4. The plaintiff can recover only in the hospital as a result of the- insuch damages as he has proven, he jury thus received and that he was
having the burden of establishing required to pay out $400 in hospital
with reasonable certainty, the extent charges and for medical, attendance.
and nature of the loss sustained by He introduced Dr. Rice who testified
him. Manistee Mill Co. vs. Hadby, that he had treated the injured arm
for his ser51 So. 871; Louisville etc., R. Co., vs and had been paid $to
qualify as
Rice
failed
Dr.
vices.
vs.
Royan
W.
357;
14
S.
Minogue,
any testigive
not
did
and
an
expert
Owen
Patterson et al, 1 S. W. 103;
extent of
and
nature
the
as
to
mony
vs. O'Rielly, 20 Mo. 603; 8 A. & E.
it was a
that
than
other
injury,
the
Enc. of Law 557; Baker vs. Manhatno testigave
'
He
wound.
gun-shot
tan R. Co., 22 Johns & S. 394; Hale
of the
results
probable
to
the
as
mony
on Damages, sec. 96-97; Baker vs.
the
plaintiff.
of
to
disability
as
injury
Railroad, 118 N. Y. 537; Woods vs.
There was no other evidence introCity of Watertown, 58 Hun. 298.
5. The court erred in giving the duced by the plaintiff as to the damfirst instruction request by the plain- ages he had sustained.
tiff, such instruction having no appliThe defendants sought"to prove by
cation to the theories of defense several witnesses that Walter Cranbrought out in the pleadings or the ford was not in the room with Nellie
evidence.
Cranford at the time the shot was
fired; that the shot was fired by NelTHE EVIDENCE IN BRIEF
lie Cranford in self-defense, the
The plaintiff and others, neighbors plaintiff being about to assualt her
of the parties to the action, testified with a shot gun; that at the time he
that on August 1. 1919, they engaged was shot, the plaintiff was attemptin a charavari at the home of And- ing to climb through the window of
rew Rater, the father of the defend- the bedroom in which Nellie Cranant Nellie Cranford; that the char- ford was hiding; that the plaintiff
avari took the form of a mock ser- and others were engaged in a riot on
enade consisting of the shooting of the premises occupied by the defendguns, beating on pans, shouting and ants and that the shot was fired in
other bedlam noises; that the plain- order to cause them to desist from
tiff Charles Dressler was one of the their unlawful acts. Mr. Barry Was
serenaders, and while so engaged in introduced by the defendants and testhe charavari, was shot and iijured tified that he was a neighbor of the
by the defendant Nellie Cranford; plaintiff and since the injury had
that at the time the shot was fired seen him engaged in pitching horse
the plaintiff was standing in the yard shoes, playing croquet, and working
beside the Rater home, Nellie Cran- in his garden hoeing potatoes.
ford firing at him from a window on
There was no evidence in rebutal
the first floor; that at the time the
the jury being instructed found
and
the
say
witnesses
the
shot was fired
plaintiff and against both dethe
for
defendant Walter Cranford, together
fendants.
with Andrew Rater in the room with
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ARGUMENT
It is the first contention of the appellants that the damages awarded
the plaintiff are excessive, that he
is entitled to recover only for actual
losses, past or future, which he has
established by a preponderance of the
evidence. This is not a case in which
exemplary damages may be awarded
the injured party, even though he
should prove circumstances exceeringly aggravating. Assault and battery, such as the one complained of
by the plaintiff, besides making the
defendant liable in a civil action for
damages, subjects him to a criminal
prosecution and punishment. It is
accordingly in that category of cases
in which punitive damages cannot be
awarded, cases which are at the same
time civil wrongs and criminal offenses. This rule is based upon the theory that the allowance of punitive
damages for a tort punishable criminally is contrary to the fundamental
principles of the common law as the
express constitutional provisions prohibiting double punishments. This
danger of double punishment is readily apparent. A criminal prosecution
is no bar to an action for damages for
the same offense, nor does the award
of damages to the injured party ever
prevent the defendant being punished in the proper criminal proceedings.
Nor does the idea of double punishment furnish the only reason for refusing punitive damages for a tort
which is also a crime. To attempt, in
a civil action, to punish a criminal
offense by allowing punitive or exemplary damages "deprives the defendant of his constitutional right of
indictment or complaint on oath, before being called into court; deprives
him of his right of meeting the witnesses against him face to face; de-

prives him of his right of not being
required to testify against himself;
deprives him of his right of being acquitted unless the proof of his offense is established beyond a reasonable doubt; deprives him of his right
of not being punished twice for the
same offense. Punitive damages destroy every constitutional safeguard
within their reach." Foster, J. Fay
vs. Parker, 16 Am. Rep. 270.
While there may be found authority for allowing punitive damages in
cases where circumstances such as
gross negligence, wantonness, or malice are sufficiently aggravating to
demand that the offender be punished for the sake of public example, the
better rule, and the one founded on
"the principle inculcated in every
well regulated system of government,
viz, that each violation of the law
should be followed certainly by one
appropriate punishment and no
more", is found in the leading case of
Tabor vs. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322. Davidson, J., in giving the decision of the
Supreme Court of Indiana, said,
"Where the defendant is sued for the
commission of a tort, such as slander,
an offense not the subject of criminal
punishment, the rule that gives damages "to punish the offender" may,
with some degree of propriety, be applied because it is the only mode in
which, by public example, the various rights in the community to personal security and private property
can, under the sanction of the law, be
protected from injury and outrage.
In such cases there is wisdom in allowing the jury to 'blend together
the interest of society and the aggrieved individual.'"
But there is a class of offenses, the
commission of which, in addition to
the civil remedy allowed the injured
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party, subjects the offender to a state
prosecution. To this class the case
under consideration belongs, and if
the principle of the instruction be correct, Tabor may be twice punished
for the same assault and battery.
This would not be in accord with the
spirit of our institutions. The constitution declares that "no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense" and though that provision may not relate to the remedies
secured by civil proceedings, still it
serves to illustrate the fundamental
principle inculcated in every well regulated system of government, viz.,
that every violation of the law be followed certainly by one appropriate
punishment and not more.
The state has undertaken to vindicate her own wrongs and can there be
any valid reasonwhysuchvindication
should be the result of a suit in favor
of a private individual. It matters
but little to the offender in what form
he pays the penalty so that he pays it
but once; but the rules of pleading do
not permit a judgment like the present to be set up as a bar to a state prdceeding. Hence the defendant still
remains liable to be tried and convicted for a public offense. Though
liable to be punished, it is true that a
criminal proceeding may not be instituted against him; but that contingency does not affect the principle involved because the penalty
which he has incurred belongs to the
state, and her failure to sue for it
would furnish no reason for its recovery in this action."
In Austin vs. Wilson, 4 Cush. 273,
which was an action for libel, the
court said, "If exemplary vindictive
or punitive damages can ever be
awarded as an example to deter
others, or as a punishment to the de-

fendant, they cannot be recovered in
an action for an injury which is also
punishable by indictment, as libel
or assault and battery. If they could
be, the defendant might be punished
twice for the same act." These cases
are followed by a formidable host of
decisions, some of which are cited
above under Points and Authorities,
1. In one of these cases, Keorner vs.
Oberly, 56 Ind. 284, a statute providing that punitive damages might be
had in a civil action for a wrong
which also constituted an indictable
offense, was held to be unconstitutional.
The plaintiff, then is entitled only
to compensatory damages, damages
which are calculated to compensate
him for the injuries which he has sus
tained by reason of the appellant's alleged wrongful act, by reason of
which "the plaintiff continued sick,
sore, and disabled for two months,
during which time he suffered great
pain; that he is permanently injured
in this, that his hand and forearm are
left stiff and inflexible, making use of
them difficult and awkward and
greatly hampering his activity as a
working farmer; that he was obliged
to pay and did pay out $400 for surgical attendance and nursing, for all
of which he is damaged to the amount
of $1,00." Plaintiff's complaint herein. He is entitled to recover only on
such items of damage as he specifies
in his complaint. Here he is setting
up four items on which he asks compensation. towit: loss of time, pain
and suffering, decreased capacity for
labor, and $400 paid out for surgical
attendance and nursing. It is not the
contention of the appellants that an
assault and battery does not entitle a
plaintiff to recover on any or all of
these items. But it is necessary for

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
him not only. to specify in what respects he was damaged but also to
prove with reasonable certainty the
existence and extent of the damage.
In this case, the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint were covered by
a. general denial by the appellants.
They denied that he was damaged to
the extent alleged or in the respects
set out. The burden of proving the
facts alleged by him was thus put on
the plaintiff, and before he can recover in this action he must prove .by
a preponderance of. the evidence all
the facts alleged in his complaint. He
is required to prove not only that the
injury was inflicted in the manner
alleged but also that it resulted in
damage to him in the amount asked.
In short, he can recover no damages
which he has not proved and the jury
can award no damages which are not
fixed with reasonable certainty by the
evidence.
Let us consider whether the plaintiff has shown any damage in the
items specified. The first consideration urged in his complaint is loss of
time. In order for him to recover for
time lost he must prove not only that
he lost time, and how much, but also
what the time was worth. The value
of time lost is found by determining
what the injured party would have
earned during the period shown if
the injury had not been inflicted, and
in order to recover, the plaintiff must
-prove his loss of earnings with reasonable certainty as to the amount. In
this case he has failed to do so. There
is nothing in the evidence to show
what he was earning before his disability or how much less he earned by
reason of the disabliity. The general denial of the defendants denied
that the plaintiff lost anything and
placed the burden on him of showing

what he did lose, if anything. He has
failed to support this burden for the
record discloses that there is no evidence whatsoever as to the amount of
his loss, or in fact, that there was any
loss of earnings. Accordingly, he
cannot be compensated on this first
item. Where loss of time is claimed
as an item of damage for a personal
injury, if the plaintiff fails to prove
the value of the time lost, only nominal damages can'be recovered. 8 Am.
& Eng. Enc. of Law 557. It is a well
established rule that to warrant substantial damages, evidence must be
given where the subject matter is
from its nature capable of proof. The
value of one's time is capable of such
proof and therefore its absence is not
excused.
In Leeds vs. Metropolitan Gas
Light Co., 90 N. Y. 26, which was an
action to recover for personal injuries, the plaintiff set up loss of time
in consequence of his confinement to
the house nad disability to labor, as
an item of damage. On the trial no
evidence was introduced as to the
amount which the plaintiff was earning before the injury, or what he lost
by reason of the confinement for the
period shown. The Court of Appeals
of New York held, "the element of
damage which consists of loss of time
is purely pecuniary and for such only
fair and just compensation can be
given and the jury. has no arbitrary
discretion but must be governed by
the weight of evidefice. The rule of
recovery is compensation. Where
the loss is pecuniary and is present
and actual and can be measured, but
no evidence is given showing its extent or from which it can be inferred,
the jury can allow nominal damages
only. Sedg. Dam., Chap. 2, p. 47,
Brantingham vs. Fay, 1 Johns Cas.
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264; New York Dry Dock Co. vs. McIntosh, 5 Hill 290. In the present
cause the jury knew simply that time
was lost by reason of the injury and
the incapacity to labor. They were
bound to consider it of some value,
but they could not go beyond nominal
damages and give compensation for
it on an arbitrary standard of their
own. Among the elements of damage is the cost of cure ,the bill and expenses of medical attendance. Suppose the bare fact was shown that the
plaintiff had a doctor but the length
of his attendance was not given, the
amount of his charge not proven,
would it do to permit the jury to give
compensation for the cost of cure upon their own guess or speculation as
to the amount? Where actual pecuniary damages are sought, some evidence must be given showing their nature and extent. If this is not done,
the jury cannot give an arbitrary estimate of their own."
Likewise in People ex rel. vs. Mutual Protective Union, 118 N. Y. 109,
which was an action to recover for
loss of earnings as a teacher, such
loss being sustained by reason of incapacity resulting from personal injury, it was held that as there was no
evidence as to what the plaintiff had
been receiving as salary for her services as a teacher in the public
schools, or what she had been receiving as wages for services as a private
teacher of music, she could recover
only nominal damages for loss of
time.
Our next consideration will be the
damages which the plaintiff is entitled to recover by reason of his alleged decreased capacity to labor. It
is the contention of the appellants
that on this point also the plaintiff
has failed to introduce sufficient evi-

dence to allow the jury to award any
damages on this item. The rule in
respect to decreased earning capacity
is similar to that governing compensation for loss of time and earnings
The loss must be shown with reasonablbe certainty before the jury can be
allowed to compensate for it. In addition to showing that there was a
wrongful act on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff must show that
the wrongful act resulted in an injury which is permanent; that the injury interferes with or prevents his
activity in the occupation in which he
was formerly engaged. He must
show the period of time for which
this condition may be reasonably expected to continue, and fix with reasonable certainty the amount by which
his earnings are thereby decreased.
Until he has done this the jury cannot consider decreased capacity to
labor as an item of compensation.
An examination of the record fails
to disclose any evidence tending to
prove these material facts. Dr. Rice
who testifies that he treated the injury, and who accordingly must have
been familiar with its nature and extent, gave no testimony to the effect
that the injury was permanent or
that it would permanently incapacitate the plaintiff. The plaintiff himself while on the stand gave no evidence that would lead anyone to believe that his injury would permanently incapacitate him or cause any
decrease in his earning power. There
is also an utter lack of evidence going
to show the earning power of the
plaintiff beforetheinjury wasinflicted.
This fact is very important and the
plaintiff's failure to prove it would
alone be sufficient to prevent the
award of compensatory damages for
decreased earning capacity even
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though he should show by a preponderance of the evidence a complete
disability to engage in his former
occupation. The jury is never permitted to guess at, or speculate on,
damages which are in their nature
pecuniary and capable of being fixed
with reasonable certainty by the evidence.
A leading report on this point i
Staal vs. Grand St. and N. R. Co., 13
N. E. which was an action for personal injuries. There was no proof
touching the age, habits, capacity,
ability to work, skill in his trade, the
wages or the earnings of the plaintiff,
or the compensation he was able to
earn, or his chances of getting work.
The trial court, recognizing the rule
laid down in Leeds vs. Metropolitan
Gas Light Co., supra, charged that
the proof did not authorize the jury
to award any damages for the inability of the plaintiff to work and earn
wages prior to the trial. But he
charged that they could award such
damages for the future, that 'is, they
could take into account, as a distinct
item if damages, the plaintiff's pecuniary loss on account of the injury
caused by the diminution of his ability to earn a livelihood and "the
chances of what money he would
make but for the injury." The Court
of Appeals of New York held that the
charge was clearly in conflict with
t. c case cited. In commenting on the
Leeds case, the court said: "There it
was held that if the value of the time
lost, or facts on which an estimate of
such value can be founded, are not
given, only nominal damages can be
awarded. There it was shown that
the plaintiff was engaged in a business at the time of the injury and that
he was not able to attend to the business since the injury, but it was not

shown what the business was or the
value of his time, or any facts as to
his occupation upon which the value
could be determined. The charge that
the plaintiff was "entitled to recover
compensation for the time lost in consequence of his confinement to the
house, inconsequenceof his 'hisability
to labor from the injury stistained,"
was held to be erroneous as the jury
was left to guess at, or speculate upon
the value of the lost time, without any
basis in that respect for their judgment to rest upon. It is true that the
charge there related to past loss; but
if a jury cannot, without any adequate basis, guess at or speculate in
such action as to the pecuniary loss
suffered by the plaintiff before the
trial, we can perceive no reason for
not applying the same rule to future
losses. Before damage for future
pecuniary loss can be awarded, there
should be some proof, such as a party
can always give, of his circumstances
and condition in life, his earning
power, skill, or capacity. So much
is left to the arbitrary judgement of
juries in this class of cases, that the
rule which requires such proof of pecuniary losses should not be relaxed."
The case at bar is exactly in point
with Staal vs. Grand Street & N. R.
Co. It is true that in the present case
the plaintiff testified that he was a
farmer by occupation. But such
proof alone is not sufficient to take
the case outside the rule. There are
farmers and farmers. There are citizens who derive enormous incomes
from agricultural pursuits while
other tillers of the soil are failing to
secure the necessities of life from
their agrarian endeavors. What is
there in the record to show what
measure of material success crowns
the efforts of the plaintiff. How can
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the jury determine his earning capacity except by pure guess or vague
speculation.
Aside from the deficiency above
pointed out, the plaintiff's case is defective in that he has failed to show
the nature and extent of his future
loss. And this short-coming is in itself fatal to his right to recover compensatory damages on this item.
Here, again, the burden was on the
plaintiff, and here, likewise, he has
failed to support it. The rule in such
case is clear. In Manistee Mill Co. vs
Hodby, 51 So. 871, another action for
personal injuries, the court in reversing the judgment, said, "In the present case the plaintiff testifies that he
was incapitated to do saw-mill work,
that is, the physical part of it, but as
it is evident that he is still capable of
doing something for a livelihood, the
burden was on the plaintiff to show
the difference between his earning
capacity before and that since the injury." In Railroad vs. Minogue, 14
S. W. 357, the court held, "while absolute certainty as to the result of the
injury should not be required, yet a
mere conjecture, or even a probability, does not warrant the giving of
damages for a future disability which
may never be realized. The future
effect of the injury should be shown
with reasonable certainty to authorize damages on the score of permanent injury." Attention is called to
the words "or even a probability does
not warrant the giving of damages
for future disability," these words
emphasizing the rule that where a
loss is purely pecuniary, and there is
a failure of evidence tending to determine it, the jury cannot be permitted to consider such item of loss in
awarding compensation for the injury.

The above arguments and authorities are presented to demonstrate the
validity of our contention that the
trial court erred in instructing the
jury that in determining the measure
of damages, they might consider the
plaintiff's loss of time and earnings,
and his decreased capacity for labor.
We maintain that before they might
consider such items, the plaintiff was
required to furnish them with evidence sufficient to determine with
reasonable certainty the amount of
such loss. He has failed to do so and
the instruction allows the jury to
compensate the plaintiff for purely
pecuniary losses which, in the trial
of the case, he did not even attempt
to establish. An instruction which
does this is clearly erroneous.
The appellants also took exception
to the first instruction requested by
the plaintiff below and which was
given by the court. The instruction
is as follows: "The jury is instructed
that though reasonable force may be
used to eject a tresspasser, the use of
a dangerous weapon is not justified
in repelling a trespass, whether such
trespass could or could not be preVented." We do not attempt to show
that this instruction does not state
the law but we base our objection to
it on the grounds that it does not
state law which is applicable to this
case. It deals with assaults committed for the purpose of removing a
trespasser from premises occupied by
the defendants. This theory of defense was not set up or relied upon by
the defendants below. They plead
that the assault was committed to
prevent the wrongful entry of a
dwelling house, which pleading presents an entirely different theory
than that dealt with in the instruction. While it may be the law that it
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is never permissable to use a dangerCONCLUSION
ous weapon in order to remove a
In closing the appellants wish to
mere trespasser, yet such force may
point
out the grounds on which they
often be applied in order to prevent
base
their
contention that the judghis wrongful entry of a dwelling
ment
should
be reversed. We have
house. It is bootless to contend that
endeavored
to
show that the plaintiff
since the instruction has no applicacan
recover
in
an action of this kind,
tion to the theories of defense plead
if
anything,
only
compensatory damby the defendants, they could not
ages;
that
to
warrant
substantial
have been prejudiced by it being
given. While to a lawyer this ir- damages, evidence must be given
relevence might by obvious, to a jury where the subject matter is, from its
of laymen it is in no wise palpable. nature, capable of proof; that the
Nor do the other instructions cure value of one's time or the extent of
the error committed in giving the one his loss of earning capacity is capin question. The ninth instruction able of such proof and in the absence
requested by the defendants and giv- of such proof, the jury cannot be peren by the court, it as follows: "The mitted to consider these items in
court instructs the jury that a per- awarding damages. The trial court
son is entitled to use reasonable force accordingly erred in charging that
to prevent a wrongful aggressor from the jury might consdier loss of time
entering the dwelling house occupied and decreased capacity for labor, for
by the former. If you find that at the record shows that the plaintiff
the defendant, Nellie Cranford, as- has introduced no evidence on either
saulted the plaintiff, while he was en- of these items. The instruction in
gaged in attempting to wrongfully order to repel a trespasser was erenter the dwelling house occupied by roneous in that it had no application
her, you shall find for the defendants to the pleadings or evidence in the
providing you believe that the force case and misled the jury as to the
used by her was such as in view of merits of the theory of defense adall the surrounding circumstances vanced by the defendants.
reasonably appeared to her to be necWherefore the appellants pray that
essary." This instruction correctly the learned Supreme Court of Notre
stated the law applicable to the the- Dame will remand the case to the
ory plead, but in the instruction to trial court with instructions to grant
which exception is taken, the jury the appellants a new trial.
was told that the use of a dangerous
Respectfully submitted to the Honweapon can never be considered as
orable,
the Supreme Court of Notre
reasonable force. Their conclusion
Dame.
must be that in shooting the plaintiff
the defendant was not acting within
the privileges allowed her by the law,
JAMES L. O'TOOLE.
as set forth in instruction No. 9,
given above.
Attorney for Appellants
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BRIEF OF ALDEN J. CUSICK IN CASE OF
CRANFORD vs. DRESSLER.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
Nellie Cranford and Walter Cranford
Appellants
VS.
Charles Dressler,
Appellee
Brief for Appellee
Appeal from Notre Dame Circuit
Court.
RECORD.
The appellant counsel's statement
of the facts and record is correct, except that plaintiff filed' a general denial to the second, third and fourth
paragraphs of the defendant's answer instead of to the first, second
and third paragraphs.
A more detailed statement of facts
and record appears on page 29, February issue, Notre Dame Law Reporter, 1921.
EVIDENCE.
The learned counsel for the appellant has, with but few exceptions,
transcribed the evidence with verity.
I shall here consider only those omissions and errors vital to this appeal.
Brief for the appellant states that
at the time Nellie Cranford fired the
shot which resulted in the injury to
Charles Dressier, according to testimony of plaintiff's own witnesses, the
said Charles Dressler was "standing
in the yard beside the Rater home."
According to Charles Dressler's own
testimony, corroborated by that of
Clyde Walsh, Gerald Craugh, Joseph
Sanford and Mike Burns, all neighbors to both the appellants and the
appellee and members of the party
which was serenading the appellants
at the time af the assault herein complained of, the plaintiff, Charles
Dressier, was standing in an alley-

way not less than nine feet from the
window through which the shot was
fired; that at no time did he leave the
alley-way and enter upon the fourfoot lawn before the window. How
then, could he have attempted to
climb through this window, as alleged by the appellants? The overwhelming testimony on this point,
therefore, becomes of great importance in considering assignment of
error five relating to the use of a
deadly weapon to resist a trespess.
As bearing upon the probable conduct of those engaged in the serenade, it is also important to consider
the fact attested by no less than five
witnesses, ithat each of the above
"trespassers" who were engaged in
an "unlawful riot" was accompanied
by his wife and children. This fact
was verified by the co-defendant,
Nellie Cranford, and her boarder and
sympathetic witness, William Fitzgerald.
Now let us review the evidence
bearing on the extent of Charles
Dressler's injury and the damage
thereby occasioned. Doctor Rice, a
graduate of Rush Medical College and
a bone specialist of ten years' experience, explained in detail the nature of Charles Dressler's injury as
revealed by exterior diagnosis before
and after removal of shot, and also
by three X-ray examinations. Doctor
Rice testified that the plaintiff's
"right arm was broken and his hand
and forearm badly lacerated and that
said arm and forearm are pernanently injured to the extent that they
will ever remain stiff and inflexible."
Dr. Rice also testified that he had received from the plaintiff, Charles
Dressler, $200.00 in full payment for
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professional service relative to injury
herein at issue.
Appellant's counsel state that there
was no evidence on damage other
than that "plaintiff suffered from
gunshot wound." As the record will
show, this is a gross misstatement of
fact. In addition to testimony that
he was "sick, sore and disabled for a
period of two months during all of
which time he was under treatment
at the St. Joseph Hospital, South
Bend, Indiana, and suffered great
bodily and mental pain, the plaintiff,
Charles Dressier, also said that he
was thirty-five years of age at the
time of the assault and was a hardworking farmer of very moderate
means and compelled to "depend on
his work on the farm for a livelihood
for himself and family of wife and
three small children"; that he had always plowed his acreage prior to the
injury and that he was no longer able
to handle a plow. The only evidence
introduced by the defendants to controvert this testimony was that of
Norman Barry, a back-door neighbor, who claimed to have seen the
plaintiff after the accident "playing
horseshoe and croquet and on one
occasion hoeing potatoes in his garden." We may admit all of these
facts without impeaching in the least
the decreased capacity of the plaintiff
to "plow and work his farm as he
had always done prior to the injury."
But we ask that the testimony of
Norman Barry be weighed in light of
his sworn statement that, in this cold
climate when potatoes are first planted in the spring, Mr. Barry saw the
plaintiff hoeing the stalks. Further,
Clyde Walsh, next-door neighbor to
the plaintiff, testified that not once
since the assault has he seen Charles
Dressler working his farm; not even
"hoeing potatoes." It seems to us

that our testimony on this point is
most convincing. A hard-working
farmer before the assault in issue,
has by this assault and battery, been
deprived in great part of the capacity
to work his farm. This evidence is
important as bearing upon the damages ($600) awarded by the jury in
addition to the $400 proved to have
been actually paid out by the plaintiff
for medical attention. We elaborate
on this point in the argument.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
I. Punitive damages may be recovered in addition to compensatory
damages in the great majority of
American states regardless of whether tort constitutes an indictable offense. We admit that Indiana decisions affirm the contrary, but contend
that they are unsound and should be
reversed.
Brown vs. Evans, 17 Fed. 512;
supported by the following: 44 Wis.
282; 76 Cal. 532; 20 Am. Rep. 668;
13 How. 371; 33 Mich. 49; 20 Am.
Rep. 668; 64 N. Y. 440; 45 Vt. 289;
19 Fla. 117; 120 Ill. 83; 29 N. W.
802; 18 N. W. 473; 21 Ia. 379; 26 Ia.
185; 29 Ala. 628; 36 Ia. 587; 2 N. W.
1079; 27 Minn. 308; 23 Miss. 61; 18
Mo. 71; 6 Hill 466; 87 N. Car. 303;
10 Ohio St. 277; 91 U. S. 493; 27 Am.
Dec. 689; 43 Me. 163; 24 Wis. 292;
91 Ill. 70; 6 Tex. 266; 27 Miss. 68 ;.23
Miss. 598; 114 Mass. 518; 45 Cal.
337; 27 Ohio St. 277; Vol. I Sedgwick
on Damages 53, 174, 323 and note
335, 344; Field on Damages 700;
Greeleaf on Evi. No. 267, Vol. II;
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 5,
page 22.
II. One thousand dollars damages
in this case not excessive: Mo. Pa.
R. R. vs. Ray, 26 S. W. 768; Smith
vs. Whittier, 30 Pac. 529; 31 Pac.
411; 53 Fed. 843; 21 S. W. 313; 30
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Pac. 601; 6 Ind. App. 332; 32 Pac.
307; 53 N. W. 982; 76 N. Y. 594; 92
S. W. 530; 27 N. E. 937; 44 S. W.
262; 169 Ill. App. 494; 61 Tex. 149;
85 Ind. 165; 61 Wis. 450; 88 Ill. 312.
III. Courts will not disturb the
verdict of a jury on the grounds that
damages awarded were excessive, unless it is clearly evident that ,the jury
acted with prejudice, partia:ity or
corruption: 141 Ind. 533; 34 Ind.
462; 21 Ind. App. 397; 84 Ind. 189;
100 Ind. 181; 11 Ind. 156; 108 Ind.
548; 120 Ind. 397; 8 App. 606; 19
App. 368; 19 App. 535; 21 App. 397;
26 App. 307; 32 App. 569; etc.
IV. The trial court did not err in
charging the jury instruction number
5; namely that plaintiff may recover
value of his time where no definite
value proved. Hence no grounds for
reversal of judgment: Mabrey vs.
Cape Giradeau & Jackson Gravel
Road, 67 S. W. 394; Harmon vs. R.
R., 168 Mass. 337; also 7 S. E. 515;
47 N. E. 100; 68 Am. Dec. 553; 21
N. E. 598.
ARGUMENT.
In the excellent brief submitted by
counsel for the appellants, great
stress and much argument is brought
to bear upon the theory that exemplary damages cannot be awarded
in a civil action for an offense
which is also criminal in its
nature.
The jury were not instructed that they might give exemplary damages. Such damages were
not claimed by the pleadings or by
the evidence, and we cannot conceive
how an intelligent jury could be led
off upon that field of investigation.
All of the instructions made by the
learned trial court contain correct
propositions of law, and if the appellants thought thiat there was any
danger that the jury might enter

upon the question of exemplary damages they ought to have requested the
court to instruct the jury, in making
up their verdict, to disregard all
claims or supposed claims on account
of exemplary damages. So plainly,
the question of exemplary damage is
beside the issues presented by this
case.
However, since the point is raised
we shall meet it and point out t6 the
learned court wherein appellants'
argument is fallacious. We admit
that Indiana courts have repeatedly
asserted that exemplary damages
cannot be recovered for a tort which
is also an indictable offense, but exhaustive search has revealed the fact
that Indiana is supported in this view
by not more than two states, and that
a great majority of the other states
have considered the question and decided that exemplary damages may
be recovered in addition to compensatory.
The United States Circuit Court in
Brown vs. Evans, 17 Fed. 912, stated
in unmistakable terms that "It may
be laid down as a general proposition
of law, elementary in character, that
in cases of personal torts such as assault and battery, slander, etc., where
the elements of fraud, malice, gross
negligence, qruelty, oppression, brutality or wantonness intervene, exemplary or punitive damages may be
recovered from the defendant. An
examination of a few of the authorities will establish the fact that it has
been the settled rule and law of this
country for more than one hundred
years and that such is now the law in
nearly every state in the Union."
For further authority on this point
we refer the learned court to page 3,
par. 1, of this brief.
And again, in the words of Justice
Grier of the United States Supreme
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Court in Day vs. Woodworth, 13 that the recovery of exemplary damHow. 371, we read: "It is a well es- ages in a civil case subjects the tort
tablished principle of the common feasor to double punishment, but this
law that in actions of trespass and all view is as unsound as their statement
actions on the case for torts a jury of the general law is falacious. "The
may inflict what are called exem- maxim of the common law that no
plary, punitive or vindictive damages one shall be twice vexed for the same
upon a defendant, having in view the cause, when it applied at all, preenormity of his offense rather than vented a second prosecution as well
the measure of compensation to the as a second punishment, and if it applaintiff. We are aware that the plied to civil damages would cover
propriety of this doctrine has been the whole, and not merely what is asquestioned by some writers; but if sumed to be a part of them. But
repeated judicial decisions for more there is no analogy between civil and
than a century are to be received as criminal remedies. The punishment
the best exposition of what the law is, by civil prosecution is for private rethe question will not adnit of argu- dress while the criminal remedy is
ment. By the common, as well as by for the grievance of the public."
statute law, men are often punished Elliot vs. VanBuren, 33 Mich. 49; 20
for aggravated misconduct or lawless Am. Rep. 608.
acts, by means of a civil action and
In further support of their contenthe damages inflicted by way of pen- tion appellants flaunt before us the
alty or punishment given to the party constitutional provision that "no perinjured."
son shall be twice put in jeopardy for
And once again we find this prin- the same offense." The words are
ciple reiterated in a Wisconsin case. correct, but their interpretation
"Exemplary damages are not design- wrong. This clause does not apply to
ed as a substitute for the ordinary civil proceeding. In a case almost
penalty imposed by the criminal laws identical with the one at bar (civil
upon the wrong committed, nor are action for assault and battery) and
they intended solely to supply the reported in 44 Wis. 287, Ryan, C. J.,
want of such a penalty for acts not said: "It would have been no subject
punishable criminally.
There is of regret to the court if the obliganothing inconsistent in allowing both tion of the constitution called upon to
remedies where the act complained of abridge the application of this rule.
is criminal. No reasonable objection But the court is unable to hold that
can be urged against subjecting one the constitutional provision has any
who has committed a crime, which is controlling bearing upon this quesalso a private wrong, to the penalty tion. The constitution only re-enacted
of damages graduated by the turpi- what was the general if not literally
tude of the act, as compensation to universal rule at common law. The
the party injured, and as warning to word 'jeopardy' is therefore used in
other evil-doers, notwithstanding the the constitution in its defined techfact that the same act as a public nical sense at the common law; and
offense is amenable to criminal pun- in this use it is applied only to strictishment." Brown vs. Swineford, 44 ly criminal proceedings by indictWis. 282.
ment, information or otherwise."
The appellants vigorously contend This same interpretation may be
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found in innumerable decisions and
texts chief of which are: 44 Wis.
285; 60 N. Y. 440; Sedgkick on Damages, page 38; 1 Bishop Crim. Law,
N. 1012; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence No.
37; 1 Alb. Law Digest, 650.
And so we conclude, that though
Indiana law on the question of exemplary damages has been correctly
stated by counsel for appellants, tl-is
law is fundamentally unsound and
contrary to the overwhelming weight
of American authority. But we
neither asked for exemplary damages in the case at issue nor were the
jury instructed to consider them; so
for disposition of this case the law on
that subject is immaterial.
The second, third and fourth points
submitted by appellants may be considered together, since they all directly relate to the trial court's instruction permitting the jury to consider loss of time and decreased
capacity to labor, in light of alleged
insufficiency of evidence.
The complaint specifically states
that the plaintiff was confined in the
hospital for a period of two months
on account of injuries sustained by
the assault and battery at bar, and
plaintiff introduced evidence to show
that he has been unable to do manual
labor since that time, and that he was
thirty-five years of age and a hardworking farmer of very moderate
means and compelled to "depend on
his farm work for a livelihood for
himself and family of wife and three
small children ;" that he had always

plowed his acreage prior to the injury but has never been able to handle a plow since. "It is true that
there was no specific evidence as to
the value of time lost, nor was it
necessary that there should be." as
was stated in Gedes vs. Foundry Co.,
25 S. W. 557.

It is a general doctrine of the law
of damages that plaintiff is required
to produce the best evidence of the
amount of damages sustained which
the nature of the case permits. A
person will not be denied compensation for a certain loss which he has
sustained because there is no absolute
way to measure such loss. So the law
commends the solution of such problems to juries. Quoting from R. R.
Co. vs. Baron, 72 U. S. 90, "The damages in these cases when the suit is
in the name of the injured party must
depend very much on the good sense
and sound judgment of the jury upon
all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case."
In Mabrey vs. Cape Girardeau &
Jackson Gravel Road Co., 69 S. W.
394, the plaintiff received injuries
whereby he sued for damages and
loss of time. The only evidence tending to prove the value of the plaintiff's time was that of his occupation,
farming. The court held in this case,
that evidence in a personal injury
action, that the plaintiff was a farmer
working his own farm was sufficient
to justify submission to the jury of
his loss of time. Also, in the words
of the court: "In an action for personal injuries if plaintiff would recover for loss of time he must establish it by the best evidence that the
nature of the case permits. In many
instances no such proof is possible
for the employment which the injured party follows yields no certain,
fixed income, yet such person will not
be denied all redress for the loss of
time because of his inability to prove
exactly what the loss was any more
than he would be deprived of compensation for his pain and anguish,
because those sufferings cannot be
measured by money."
In the case of Harmon vs. the R. R.
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Co., 168 Mass. 337, the court said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge
that average jurors in countries
where agricultural pursuits are followed have a fair general opinion of
the loss sustained by a farmer being
laid up for a month or more due to
personal injuries. They possess such
information without being enlightened by expert testimony, as-the experts themselves would have to be
gathered from the same class of men
that usually constitute the juries."
The appellants greatly stress the
fact that we did not prove the earning capacity of our appellee before
the assault and battery and the decrease in that capacity for his life
expectancy after the injury, as determined by standard mortality
tables. In the case of a hard-working farmer "of very moderate
means" these facts are incapable of
ascertainment. Every case cited by
the appellants has to do with those
who are on salary or have regular
and definite incomes; not one applies
to a farmer working his own farm
for the livelihood of himself and
family." In Petrie vs. the R. R. Co.,
7 S. E. 515, the court says: "There
are certain employments so extensively followed and so intimately
blended with the customary life of
our people and within everyone's experience that the law wisely declines
to exact specific proof of them, deeming it expedient to trust rather to the
general source of information which
all men have access to, since exact
proof is unobtainable in any event."
The following citations support this
contention: 101 U. S. 453; 38 S.W.
162; 15 L. Ed. 812; 7 S. E. 512; 47
N. E. 100; 68 Am. Dec. 553; 21 N. E.
598; 23 S. W. 760; 116 Mo. 269; 14
S. W. 756; 67 U. S. 592.
The appellants tell us that "There

are farmers and farmers. There are
citizens who derive enormous incomes from agricultural pursuits
while other tillers of the soil are failnig to secure the necessities of life
from their endeavors. What is there
in the record to measure what material success crowns the effort of the
plaintiff? How can the jury determine his earning capacity except by
pure guess or speculation?" They
may determine this information, as
in this case they did determine it, by
their general knowledge and observation of "hard-working farmers of
very moderate means compelled to
depend on their work on the farm for
the support of a wife and three small
children. That the plaintiff was in
this category, was proved by his own
testimony supported by that of at
least two witnesses, and there was no
evidence introduced by the appellant
to controvert the fact. We agree that
where capable of ascertainment,
earning capacity must be proved.
But the income of a farmer is dependant on so many variable factors
that definite determination of income
is impossible and approximate certainty is best arrived at by a jury
"composed of ordinary men of ordinary experience."
So, it is evident that the learned
court did not err in charging the jury
that they might consider loss of time
and decreased capacity for labor, on
the grounds of insufficiency of evidence, because in the case at bar definite proof is unnecessary and impossible. Hence the second, third and
fourth points considered by the
appellants are unsound and untenable.
But we may even concede that the
court erred in permitting the jury to
consider loss of time and decrease
capacity to labor, and still uphold our
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$1000 verdict, on physical and mental theory of the case. But since the
suffering together withthe $400 prov- jury rendered a verdict to the plained to have been actually expended for tiff, and to the full amount asked, it
medical attention. It will be noted must b~e presumed that the appelthat appellants studiously evade the lant's theory is no longer material.
item of physical and mental suffer- Plaintiff proved by not less than four
ing. In Reddin vs. Gates, 2 N. W. witnesses that he was at no time
623, we read "That pain and suffer- within nine feet of the window which
ing constitute an element of compen- the appellant claimed that he opened
satory damages has never been and partially entered. Hence there
doubted." And in 10 S. W. 288, we was no "breaking and entry" as dehave authority that "mental suffer- termined by the jury, so the above ining will be inferred from severe phy- struction as applying to an ordinary
sical injury without direct proof that trespass was correct.
such suffering ensued."
Before closing, we wish to remind
And for
authority that compensation for this the learned court that appellants
pain and suffering may be left to the have not even contended that the
discretion of a jury we refer the damages awarded by the jury are so
learned court to Hale on Damages, p. excessive as to indicate that they
70: "Pain and suffering, injury to acted from prejudice, partiality or
the feelings and the like cannot be fraud, and this must be proved under
measured by arithmetical rule; and Indiana Statute Vol. 1, 585, before a
of necessity the compensation for court will overthrow a verdict. We
such injuries is left to the sound dis- conclude this point in the words of
cretion of a jury." Hence the $600
Hale (Hale on Damages, p. 233):
in question may be recovered in com- "Tortious injuries to the person are
pensation for physical pain and men- without precise pecuniary measure.
tal suffering, which is implied from The law has, therefore, committed
the injury. The $400 for medical ex- the determination of the amount of
pense is not questioned.
dainages to be awarded to the experiWe refer the court to authorities ence and good sense of jurors. And
cited under point 11, Page 3, of this where the verdict rendered by them
brief for proof that $600 is not ex- may reasonably be presumed to have
cessive to cover the above items of resulted from an honest and intelligent exercise of judgment upon their
damage.
The fifth contention of the appel- part, the policy of the court is, and
lant is that the court erred in grant- necessarily must be, not to interfere
ing plaintiff's instruction number 5, wtih their conclusion." Walker vs.
namely "The jury is instructed that R. R. Co., 63 Barb 260-267. And as
though reasonable force may be used stated by the Supreme Court of Into eject a trespasser, the use of a dan- diana in Louisville, New Albany &
gerous weapon is not justified in re- Chi. R. R. Co. vs. Miller, 141 Ind.
pelling a trespass, whether such tres- 533: "Since nothing appears to inpass could or could not have been duce the belief that the jury must
prevented."
This instruction was have acted from prejudice, partaility
conformable to OUR theory of the or other improper motive in the ascase. The appellants object to it be- sessment of the damages we cannot
cause it disagrees with THEIR disturb their verdict. It was their
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exclusive province to determine the
amount of compensation to be awarded for the injury sustained by the
plaintiff, and having determined it,
so far as we can judge, upon the evidence without the j ntervention of
improper motives, the court cannot
interfere." And again: "Besides the
trial judge had vastly better opportunities of weighing the evidence
than we have, if we even had the
authority to do so, and it was his
duty, if he thought the damages were
excessive, to promptly grant a new
trial and the legal presumption is
that he courageously did his duty.
Therefore by refusing the new trial
he has said to us that, after carefully
reviewing the evidence he is of the
opinion that the damages are not excessive." Supported by Cincinnati R.
W. Co. vs. Madden, 34 Ind. 462.
CONCLUSION.
In conclusion the appellee wishes
to point out the grounds on which he
asks the learned court to sustain his
verdict for $1000. This sum covers
only compensatory damages, to-wit:
$400 medical expense, loss of time,

decrease capacity to labor, physical
and mental suffering. Appellants
grant that $400 damage recoverable.
Loss of time, present and future, is
impossible of ascertainment in the
case of a "hard-working farmer of
very moderate means," by any definite rule. Dr. Rice testified that injury is permanent and neighbors asserted that they have never since the
injury seen the plaintiff plowing and
working his farm as he always did
before, therefore proving beyond a
doubt that the plaintiff's capacity to
labor has been decreased. The injury
was proved and therefore physical
and mental pain is presumed without
proof. This latter alone is sufficient
to support the whole verdict of
$1000. Instruction No. 1 was correct.
Wherefore the appellee prays that
the learned Supreme Court of Notre
Dame will sustain the verdict of the
trial court and jury.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDEN J. CUSICK,
Attorney for Appellee.
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NOTRE

DAME CIRCUIT
(Junior Division)

CAUSE NO. 20.
John Reilly
VS.
Gerald Davenport.
Vincent B. Pater and
Aaron H. Huguenard,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Franklyn E. Miller and
John J. Buckley,
Attorneys for Defendant.
FACTS.
On the 8th day of July, 1920, plaintiff parked his automobile in at the
curbing in front of his residence, No.
407 west side of Michigan Street, in
South Bend, Indiana. The defendant,
while driving and operating his own
machine in and along said Michigan
Street, drove his car into plaintiff's
automobile, damaging it to the extent of about $1000. Plaintiff's car
was at the time so parked as to violate an ordinance of the city in that
it was parked at an angle with the
curb than 45 degrees. Plaintiff's car
was unoccupied at time of the collision.

COURT

Defendant files answer in three
paragraphs.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
certain specified parts of the second
and third paragraphs of answer,
which motion the court overrules as
to each specification, and to each ruling the plaintiff excepts.
Plaintiff files motion to require
defendant to separate his third paragraph of answer into separate defences and number them. Motion
overruled, to which plaintiff excepts.
Plaintiff files several demurrer to
the second and third paragraphs of
answer. Court sustains the demurrer
to each paragraph, to which ruling
the defendant severally excepts.
The case being at issue is submitted to the jury for trial.
Trial concluded. Parties submit instructions, some of which are given
as modified, and some refused because they were covered by the
court's instructions.

Four arguments were made to the
jury, after which the court instructed the jury in writing in twelve instructions which were filed and orTRIAL RECORD.
dered by the court to be made part of
the record without bill of exceptions.
Plaintiff filed complaint in two
The jury retire to the jury room in
paragraphs and praecipe for sum- charge of a sworn bailiff,
to delibmons.
erate upon the case and arrive at a
Defendant files motion to require verdict.
plaintiff to separate his second paraCome now the jury into open court
graph of complaint into separate and return the following verdict:
causes of action and number them. "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff
Motion sustained.
and assess his damage in the sum of
Plaintiff files amended second $650.00. (Signed) J. V. Jones, Foreparagiaph of complaint.
man."
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(Senior Division)
CAUSE NO. 21.
Earnest M. Blanchett
VS.
Albert, B. Taylor.
William S. Allen,
Frank Francescovich and
George Wittried,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Frank E. Coughlin,
Edmund J. Meagher and
Henry W. Fritz,
Attorneys for Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The following contract was entered
into by the parties, namely:
"LAND CONTRACT.
This agreement made and entered
into this first day of September, 1921,
witnesseth that Albert B. Taylor of
St. Joseph County, Indiana, has this
day plased with Earnest M. Blanchett of South Bend, Indiana, a real
estate agent, for sale or exchange the
following described property: (Insert)
The said Taylor agrees to pay to
said Blanchett one dollar per acre of
said real estate commission out of the
first funds received in payment on
account of such asle or on the exchange of said property, in case a
purchaser is found; or said property
is sold or exchanged through said
Blanchett or through his influence,
or if he assists in any way in the sale
or exchange of said property.
The said Albert B. Taylor hereby
reserves the right to withdraw said
property from sale or exchange at
any time by giving ten days notice in

writing, and this agreement to remain in full force until such notice is
given and expires.
It is further agreed that is said
Albert B. Taylor shall secure a purchaser without the aid or assistance
of said Earnest M. Blanchett, while
the property is still in his hands under this contract, said Blanchett is
not to redeive any compensation for
his services rendered.
(Signed)
Albert B. Taylor,
Earnest M. Blanchett."
Pursuant to the contract Blanchett
on September 5th, 1920, procured
and furnished one Alfred R. Hardesty as a prospective purchaser for
said lands, or one who would exchange lands with said Taylor. That
Blanchett accompanied said Hardesty out to the Taylor land and introduced him to Taylor for purchase
or exchange of the land described.
That sometime after negotiations had
been pending, Taylor informed Blanchett that he stood in the way of a
deal; that Hardesty would not purchase so long as Blanchett represented him, Taylor. On September 30th,
Taylor delivered to Blanchett a written notice of his withdrawal of said
land from sale or exchange, Blanchett declaring at the time to Taylor
that if the Hardesty deal was closed
he, Blanchett, would insist on his
commission. On October 15th, said
Taylor and said Hardesty closed
their contract for the purchase in
part and exchange in part of the
premises described in the contract of
Blanchett. On October 20th, Blanchett demanded of Taylor $200 commission, that being a dollar per acre
of the Taylor lands, which demand
chettwas refused by Taylor.
At the time of the notice to Blan-
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chett and for ten days thereafter, the
deal between Taylor and Hardesty
remained open, that is, not finally
executed, although Hardesty admits
that the terms of the deal were all
practically agreed upon at that time,
and that the deal as closed was virtually decided upon before the expiration of the notice of ten days. That
at the first meeting of Taylor and
Hardesty after this notice was given
to-wit: on October 15th, they readily
closed their contract.
Blanchett brings action in the
common law form for the recovery
of his commission, $200.

ation, to which ruling plaintiff excepts.
Defendant files plea in four counts
to the second and third counts of
declaration.
Plaintiff files general demurrer to
each of the counts of plea, the second,
third and fourth, defendant joining
in demurrer, the court sustains the
same, defendant severally excepting
to the ruling.
Defendant files amended plea in
two counts, general issue traverse
and good faith personal sale of property after revoking contract with
plaintiff.
TRIAL RECORD.
Plaintiff files general demurrer to
the
amended second count of plea, in
Plaintiff files declaration in four
which the defendant joins. Demurcounts of assumpsit.
Defendant files special demurrer rer overruled to which plaintiff excepts.
which is sustained.
Plaintiff files general issue traPlaintiff files amended declaration
in three counts of special assumpsit. verse to second count of plea.
Cause at issue, the parties waive a
Defendant files general demurrer
jury
trial and the case is submitted
to each count of declaration, plaintiff
filing joinder. The court sustains the to the court for trial.
demurrer to the first count of declarTrial pending.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER

TRIAL BRIEF IN CASE OF
James Mansfield vs. Daniel O'Connor
Cause No. 4
JUNIOR MOOT COURT
By
Edwin J. McCarthy for Plaintiff
Joseph I. Farley for Defendant
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
James Mansfield in company with three others went upon the farm of
Daniel O'Connor to hunt. This was without the permission and knowledge
of O'Connor. O'Connor had signs tacked upon his fences on which was
printed: "No hunting allowed on these premises." O'Connor owned and
kept a big shepherd dog. This dog had the known habit of running to the
fence and barking viciously at passers-by. On one occasion the dog had gone
through the open gate and bitten a man, of which fact O'Connor had been
informed.
Mansfield, on the occasion in question, had no knowledge whatever that
O'Connor had a dog until the dog viciously attacked him and seriously
wounded him, biting him three times in the leg. O'Connor was not at home
at the time of the hunting trip of Mansfield, and knew nothing whatever
about the matter until he arrived home later.
Mansfield brings action for the damages occasioned by the dog's biting.
Edwin J. McCarthy for Plaintiff.
Upon this state of facts we maintain that the defendant is liable to
the plaintiff in an action of tort, for
personal injuries inflicted by the
domestic animal of the defendant.
The defendant is guilty of a tort.
The keeping of this animal is more,
than mere nonfeassance; it is aggression. The fact of the defendant's
guilt rests not upon the nature of the
class to which the dog belongs but
rather upon its propensities to do
evil.
PRIMA FACIE.
From the facts as set out in the
statement concerning the vicious nature of the dog and his general reputation for attacking people and injuring them; and then the injury to

the plaintiff by this animal, we contend that by reason of the substantive law in the decisions of the courts
that there exists a prima facie case
against the defendant. In support
of this we offer the following cases:
Partlow vs. Haggerty, 35 Ind. 178,
the court says: "Whoever keeps a
vicious animal; accustomed to attack
and bite mankind, with knowledge of
its vicious propensities, is prima
facie liable for an action in damages." Further support is found in
the case of Williams vs. Moray et al.,
74 Ind. 25. The rule as discussed in
the leading case of. Muller vs. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195, 29 Am. Repts.
123, is as follows: "It may be that in
a certain sense, an action against the
owner for an injury by a vicious dog
or other animal is based upon negli-
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gence; but such negligence consists,
not in the manner of keeping or confining the animal, or the care exercised in keeping or confining him, but
in the fact that he is ferocious, and
that the owner knows it, and proof
that he is savage and ferocious is
equivalent to express notice . . . the
negligence consists in keeping such
an animal . . . In some of the cases
it is said that from the vicious propensity and knowledge of the owner,
negligence will be presumed, and in
others that the owner is prima facie
liable. This language does not mean
that the presumption or prima facie
case may be rebutted by proof of any
amount of care on the part of the
owner in keeping or restraining the
animal."
SCIENTER.
That the plaintiff is further entitled to damages because the defendant was possessed of knowledge
of the vicious propensities of his dog
and continued to keep the animal, being thus charged with scienter. "Not
in the manner of the keeping of the
animal, but any keeping after a
vicious demonstration is scienter,"
case of Hammond vs. Melton, 42 Ill.
App. 186. Other cases, Ahlastrand
vs. Bishop, 88 Ill. App. 424, and
Marsh vs. Jones, 69 Atl. 182.
DUTY AND LIABILITY TO
TRTSPASSERS.
It is also a strong rule of law that
the owner of a vicious dog is liable to
any person subjected to personal injuries by such animal, be the party a
trespasser or lisencee. In support of
this contention we offer the leading
case, in which the court said: "That
where a boy was hunting in the defendant's woods and was attacked
and bitten by a ferocious dog har-

bored by the defendant, he was entitled to .recover for the damages
altho he was a trespasser." Loomis
vs. Terry, 17 Wend. 496, 31 Am. Dec.
306. In the case of Marble vs. Ross,
124 Mass. 44, the court held: "That
the keeper of an animal known to be
dangerous which injures another is
held to the same degree of responsibility as in the cases of wanton injury, and the fact that the person injured is trespassing does not exhonorate the owner from his negligence
in keeping the animal." The court
also held in the case of Johnson vs.
Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 36 Am. Dec.
96, that "The keeping of a ferocious
dog is unlawful on the same principle that spring guns, concealed
spears, or poisoned food is unlawful
to protect- against trespassers." In
further support of our contention
that the defendant has been wantonly
negligent in keeping this animal
which has injured the plaintiff and
that because of this keeping and this
injury to the plaintiff said defendant
is liable for the damage to the plaintiff we offer the following cases and
text citations: Bigelow on Torts, pp.
248, 250; Sherfey vs. Bartley, 4
Sneed 58, 67 Am. Dec. 597; Woolf vs.
Chalker, 31 Conn. 121, 81 Am. Dec.
175; Knowles vs. Mulder, 74 Mich.
202; Cooley on Torts, 345; Bishop
Non-Cont. Law 1235 et seq.; 1
Thomp. Neg. p. 220, sect. 34; Miller
vs. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195, 29 Am.
Repts. 123; Rider vs. White, 65 N. Y.
54, 22 Am. Rept. 600; also 14 L. R.
A. 197, case of Conway vs. Grant.
CONCLUSION.
We might continue for an indefinite time citing and abstracting cases
in support of our contention that the
defendant is liable for these injuries
to the plaintiff; but we belipve that
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we have plainly shown these points; brings out that the boiler was neglifirst, that the plaintiff has a prima gently handled and cared for by the
facie case against the defendant, be- employees of the company and as a
cause of the keeping of the dog; result it exploded. Appellee sues to
second, that the defendant is fully recover $5000 for injuries received.
liable for these injuries because he The court held that a licensee while
was well possessed of scienter, thus on another's premises did nothing to
increasing his own liability because produce his injury, but it was caused
of this knowledge, and third, that, wholly by the negligence of the propeven regarding the trespass, the de- erty owner, does not render the latter
fendant is liable to the plaintiff for liable therefor, if there was merely
this injury because he was possessed passive, and not wilful negligence.
of scienter and was negligent in
It is necessary at this point to diskeeping such an animal upon his tinguish between passive and wilful
premises. Therefore we contend that negligence and the best way to do
the plaintiff had a right to the secur- this is by defining both terms. In St.
ity of his person, and that the de- Louis R. R. Co. vs. Holsman, 57 S. W.
fendant owed him a duty even tho 770; Victor Coal Co. vs. Muir, 26 L.
he was a trespasser to provide such R. A. 435, we find: Wilful iieglisecurity from an animal in said de- gence is meant not strictly negligence
fendants keeping, and therefore he is at all to speak exactly, since negliliable for the damage 'incurred by gence implies inadvertence, and
the plaintiff. We ask the court to wherever there is an exercise of the
render the decision for the plaintiff, will in a particular direction, there
James Mansfield.
is an end of inadvertence, but rather

an intentional failure to perform a
Joseph H. Farley for Defendant.
manifest duty which is important to
From the facts the court can read- the person injured.
ily see that the plaintiff was a licenOn the other hand, "Passive Neglisee on the premises of the defendant. gence" is nothing more than careIn Cooley on Torts, page 1268, we lessness. When a person fails to do
find this definition of the position of something that he might have done,
a licensee: "The general rule sup- yet is under no responsibility to do
ported by the authorities, is that the this act yet had he done so he might
owner or occupant of premises owes or might not have averted possible
no duty to licensees and trespassers, danger, he is guilty of carelessness
further than to rferain from wilful or commonly called Passive negliacts or injury." In support of this gence. By this definition it is plain
contention we quote the case of Indi- to be seen that the defendant in this
ana Refining Co. vs. John J. Mobley, case was guilty of only passive negliAppellee, 24 L. R. A. 497 N. S., Ky. gence and not of wilful negligence
Court of Appeals.
and therefore he cannot be held liable
Facts: The appellee went upon the because by the weight of authority
grounds of the appellant company the owner or occupant of land owes
with their permission to solicit in- no duty to a licensee further than to
surance from their employees. While refrain from wilful acts or injury.
there he was injured by the explodIn Harry Benson by his next
ing of a steam boiler. The evidence friend vs. Baltimore Traction Co., 20
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L. R. A. 714, the facts are: The
plaintiff was a member of the graduating class of the Baltimore Manual
Training School. The principal of
the school received wiitten permission from the defendant company to
have the class inspect the plant.
The basement was poorly lighted and
the plaintiff was unable to see the
vat and the guide failed to warn him
of the fact that it was there and as a
result he fell into the boiling water
and was badly scalded. As a result
of the burns thus received the plaintiff was confined to his bed for a long
time and has been permanently injured. He brings this action to recover.
The court held that one of a class
of students to whom permission is
given upon request to inspect a
power house cannot recover for injuries received by falling into an uncovered vat of boiling water while
making the inspection of the premises.
Ritz vs. City of Wheeling, 31 S. E.
993; Bennett vs. Railroad Co., 102
U. S.; Galveston Oil Co. vs. Morton,
7 S. W. 756; Railroad Co. vs. Bingham, 28 0. St.; Carleton vs. Steel
Co., 99 Mass. 216; and many others
support the doctrine "that a mere
licensee who is injured by any dangerous machine or contrivance on the
land or premises of another cannot
recover damages unless the contrivance is such that the owner may not

lawfully erect or use or when the injury is inflicted wilfully, wantonly or
through the gross negligence of the
owner or occupant of the premises.
Search vs. Blackburn, 4 Car. & P.
297, decides that a man has a right
to a fierce dog for the protection of
his property, but he has no right to
put the dog in such a situation in the
way of access to his house that a person innocently coming for a lawful
purpose may be injured by it. It is
said that if a man puts a dog in a
garden walled all around, and a
wrong-doer goes into the garden and
is bitten he cannot complain in a
court of justice of that which was
brought upon him.by his own act.
Loomis vs. Terry, 17 Wend. 497, 31
Am. Dec. 306. A man may use a
ferocious dog as a protection against
unseasonable trespassers.
In conclusion, to summarize our
points: 1st, Mansfield was a trespasser on the property of O'Connor;
2nd, the owner or occupant of land
owes the trespasser no duty except
that he shall not wantonly cause him
to be injured; 3rd, defendant was
not guilty of wilful negligence in the
case, but merely of passive negligence. It is therefore our contention
that plaintiff has no right of action
against our client.. In view of the
facts and the numerous decisions of
the courts, and the leading authorities, we pray judgment of the court
for defendant.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER

CHIMINAL PRACTICE
Be it Remembered, That, to-wit:
on February 4, 1921, the Notre Dame
Criminal Practice Court convened
pursuant to law, with the regular
Judge, Francis J. Vurpillat, presiding and following officers attending,
to-wit: Louis C. Lujan, Clerk of the
Court, and Peter Smith, Sheriff. The
court being opened in due form the
following proceedings were had and
orders made, to-wit:
The Grand Jury for the term are
hereby ordered to be called for service on February 11th, and the Clerk
is directed to issue venire for said
jury returnable at the time stated.
The Court does now appoint James
R. Emschwiller Prosecuting Attorney, and E. W. Gould, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, till the further
order of this court. Come now said
appointees and qualify by taking the
oath of office.
The Court appoints Thomas Plouff
and John W. Gleason as Jury Commissioners, who come and take the
oath as such Jury Commissioners.
Come the Jury Commissioners and
report to the court the drawink of
the following qualified citizens as
Grand Jurors for the present term of
this court, to-wit: Lyle Miller, John
Cochran, Daniel Lynch, James Hodler, George Dever and Thos. Keating.
The Clerk is herey directed to
issue venire for the grand jury, returnable Friday, February 11, 1921.
Ordered that court adjourn till
Friday, February 11, 1921.

COURT

In re Grand Jury,
February Term, 1921.
Come now the grand jurors, heretofore regularly drawn and summoned for service at the February
Term, 1921, of this court, who are
now sworn and qualified as such. The
court now instructs said grand jury
in open court and they retire in
charge of a sworn bailiff to begin
their work.
The following statement of facts is
submitted to the Prosecuting Attorney for submission to the Grand Jury
upon which to base any indictment
or indictments, to-wit:
Hugh Hittem and Isaiah Fight sat
at opposite sides of an ordinary
table, engaged in an effort at settlement of their accounts. A heated
controversy arose in the course of
which Hugh Hittem abruptly jumped
to his feet and, striking his fist on
the table, said, "You are a dlying crook." Isaiah Fight jumped
up and at Hittem, striking him with
his fist, a general fight ensuing in
which Hittem badly beat up Fight.
This occurred in Brownson Hall Rec.
Room, Notre Dame, St. Joseph
County, Indiana, on February 4th,
1921.
Come now the Grand Jury and return into open court the following
indictments:
Indictment No. 1
against Isaiah Fight for assault and
bottery; Indictment No. 2 against
Hugh Hittem for assault and battery; Indictment No. 3 against Hugh
Hittem for provocation. The court
orders bench warrants for the imFriday, February 11, 1921, court mediate arrest of the indicted permet pursuant to adjournment with sons.
the regular judge and officers in atComes now the Sheriff and brings
tendance. The following proceedings into court Isaiah Fight, and Hugh
were had and orders made, to-wit:
Hittem under arrest and makes re-
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turn on the warrants issued to him case is set for trial Friday, February
for their arrest, to-wit: (insert).
25th. The bond heretofore accepted
The Court now designates Eugene by the sheriff is approved.
Peyton and John W. Niemic as at- State of Indiana
torneys to defend the prisoners.
VS.
Come now said attorneys and on mo- Hugh Hittem
tion the bonds of the said defendants
Indictment for
is fixed at $100 each for their apProvocation.
pearance in this court to answer the
Come the parties and this case is
respective charges on next Friday, set for trial Friday, February 25th.
February 18, 1921.
The bond heretofore accepted by the
Court ordered to adjourn till Fri- Sheriff is approved.
Ordered that court adjourn till
day, February 18, 1921.
Friday, February 25th, 1921.
Court cQnvened pursuant to adjournment with the regular judge
Court convened pursuant to adand officers in attendance. The fol- journment with the regular judge
lowing proceedings were had and or- and officers in attendance. The folders made, to-wit:
lowing orders were made and proState of Indiana
ceedings had, to-wit:
VS.
State of Indiana
Isaiah Fight
VS.
Indictment for
Hugh Hittem
Assault and Battery.
Indictment for
Comes now the defendant and preAssault and' Battery.
sents his bond for his appearance
Counsel for the State and the defrom time to time throughout the fendants appear and the defendant
case, which bond, heretofore ap- appears in person. Defendant pleads
proved and accepted by the sheriff, is not guilty. The following men are
approved by the court. Defendant empanelled, .charged and sworn to try
appearing by his counsel, Eugene the case and the same is submitted to
Peyton and John Niemice, moves to them for trial, to-wit: Eugene
quash the indictment. State appear- Oberst, James Clark, John E. White,
ing by James Emschwiller and Ed- Louis Glotzbach, William Duncan,
ward W. Gould, arguments are Matt. McEnery, Pat. O'Connell, Geo.
heard, and the court being advised, O'Grady, Hiram Hunt, Albert Hicks,
overrules the motion to quash the in- A. Stanley Bradbury and Eugene
dictment, to which ruling the de, Hines, twelve good and lawful men,
fendant excepts. Defendant is ar- householders or freeholders of St.
raigned and for his plea says he is Joseph County and legal voters therenot guilty. The case is set for trial in. The statement of facts and the
Friday, February 25th.
law of the case are presented and
State of Indiana
argued by counsel. The opening
VS.
argument for the State is made by
Hugh Hittem
James Emschwiller who is followed
Indictment for
by Eugene Peyton in the first plea
Assault and Battery.
for the defendant, this argument in
Come parties by counsel and th's progress at time of adjournment.
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Cause continued for trial Friday,
March 4th, 1921.
State of Indiana vs. Iasiah Fight
for assault and battery, and State of
Indiana vs. Hugh Hittem for provocation, are continued till Friday,
March 4th.
Comes now the sheriff and makes
return of the venire, showing the following petit jurors summoned for
service this day, to-wit:
Ordered that court adjourn till
Friday, March 4, 1921.
Court convened again on Friday,
March 4, 1921. The case of the State
of Indiana vs. Hugh Hittem was resumed for trial. Arguments for the
defendant were concluded by Messrs.
Eugene Peyton and John Niemice.
The closing arguments for the state
were made by Messrs. James Emschwiller and Edwin Gould. The court
then instructed the jury. The jury
retire in charge of a sworn bailiff.
The jury now return into open court
their verdict, which is as follows:
State of Indiana,
County of St. Joseph, ss:
In the Notre Dame Criminal Practice Court, January Term, 1921.
We, the jury, find the defendant,
Hugh Hittem, not guilty.
(Signed)
J. Stanley Bradburry,
Foreman.

State of Indiana
VS.
Isaiah Fight
Indictment for
Assault and Battery.
Defendant comes in person and by
his attorneys, Eugene Peyton and
John Niemice. Comes also the Prosecuting Attorney, James Emschwiller, and his assistant, Edwin Gould.
The defendant waives arraignment
and for his plea says he is not guilty.
Defendant waives trial by jury and
the cause is submitted to the court
for trial. Facts are presented and
the arguments heard after which the
court finds the defendant guilty of
assault and battery as he stands
charged in the indictment, and assesses his punishment at a fine of $5
and the costs of the action. Judgment accordingly.
State of Indiana
VS.
Hugh Hittem
Provoking
Assault and Battery.
Defendant appears in person and
by his counsel and come also the
state's attorneys. Defendant waives
trial by jury and the case is submitted to the court for trial. Facts are
presented and argued by James
Emschwiller and Edwin Gould for
the State and by Eugene Pepton and
John Niemice for defendant. Court
finds defendant guilty as charged, of
It is therefore ordered, adjudged provocation of Isaiah Fight, and asand decreed that the defendant, sesses his punishment at a fine of $5
Hugh Hittem, is not guilty of as- and the costs of the action. Judgsault and battery on Isaiah Fight, as ment accordingly.
Ordered that court adjourn till
charged in the indictment and that
March 17, 1921.
he go hence acquit.
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ONLY OUR OWN OPINION
A NATIONAL DIVORCE LAW
By John P. Tiernan, A. B., LL. B.
There is now pending before both
Houses of Congress the following
"Congress shall
joint resolution:
have power to establish and enforce,
by appropriate legislation, uniform
laws as to marriage and divorce,
Provided, that every state may by
law exclude, as to its citizens duly
domiciled therein, any or all causes
for absolute divorce in such laws
mentioned." This resolution is the
outcome of agitation for a National
Divorce Law and if passed by the
requisite two-thirds in both Houses
will be immediately submitted to the
states for ratification. That will at
once raise the question: Is a National
Divorce Law legally necessary? Let
us refer briefly to the leading case on
the subject. In Haddock vs. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562; 26 S. Ct. R. 525;
50 A. Ed. 547, the facts were that the
parties were married in N. Y. State
and they there established the matrimonial domicile. Later the husband
deserted his wife, and after living in
several different states finally acquired a residence in Connecticut.
He thereupon brought action against
his wife for divorce, alleging that she
had deserted him, and obtained a decree, she having been served constructively by the Connecticut court.
On his return to New York State she
sued him for separation alleging that
he had deserted her, and obtained a
decree, the New York court refusing
to recognize the judgment of the
Connecticut court.
The case was
taken to the United States Supreme
Court and the decision of the New
York court was affirmed. The court
held that under the full faith and

credit clause of the constitution a
decree of divorce is not entitled to
compulsory recognition in another
state unless the divorcing state had
jurisdiction of the parties, and since
in this case the Connecticut court had
not by its constructive service of
process upon a non-resident, acquired
the requisite jurisdiction, its decree
was inoperative within the State of
New York. The substance of the
opinion is that the granting of a
divorce is strictly a State and not a
Federal power; that each state has
exclusive jurisdiction to grant a
divorce as to a resident, but no jurisdiction to do so as to a non-resident,
and, that the decision of a state that
a party is a resident is not conclusive
upon another state. Hence under the
generalization in this decision, the
regulatioii of divorce is wholly vested
in the separate states, since it is not
a power expressly or impliedly conferred on the National Government
by the Constitution. And not only is
it a state power, but each state can
regulate the subject of divorce according to its own view of social
policy. And lastly, in granting a divorce a state is within its power even
though another state has already
acted in the case. In the light of
these principles it is clear therefore
that the purpose of the proposed
amendment to the constitution is to
confer upon the United States absolute power to legislate on this subject and, incidentally, by destroying
that power as it now exists in the
states, to nullify all state legislation
and establish a National Uniform
Divorce Law.
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The writer is not especially qualified to express authoritative opinions
on the social necessity for this
amendment. He is convinced however in view of the decision in the
leading case, that it is legally necessary. There are forty-eight different
divorce laws throughout the states of
the Union. And it is not merely a
variation in the language of the law,
but a radical difference in policy, that
is evident in this legislation. South
Carolina, for example, absolutely
prohibits divorce. Washington allows it for ten enumerated causes,
and then by way of inclusion and exhaustion superadds an omnibus
clause: "and for any other causes
deemed sufficient by the court." The
other states have varying statutes
such as New York which authorizes
divorce for adultery only, and Nevada which grants it for cruelty, on
six months' residence being shown.
A National Divorce Act will perform the very desirable service of
unifying these laws so that migratory divorces based on transitory
residence or domestic divorce based
on trivial grounds, will be abolished.
A divorce will under proposed federal regulatino be granted for only
specified limited cauges and when
once granted will be vadid in every
state of the Union, since the judgments of the federal courts will be
binding. on the states, and they will
possess no power to impeach them,
such as they exercise under the full
faith and credit clause as construed
in the leading case.
It is believed the ratification of the
Amendment is a certainty. The general direction of constitutional development is certainly toward federalization. It is a progressive age,
and where the states have failed to

remedy this great evil federal regulation is the only solution. There is
still a large residency police power
in the states, but it is gradually being
absorbed by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court or being surrendered by constitutional amendment. So will it be with the regulation of divorce. Once the res6lution
passes both Houses and is gubmitted
to the states, it will be ratified in a
short time. In fact the legislatures
of California, Illinois and New York
have anticipated the submission and
by resolution expressed their approval informally. It requires but
thirty-six states for ratification and
while the Southern States are, it is
true, conservative in surrendering
any of their police power, the amendment is capable of ratification even
as against them. And certainly the
womanhood of the nation is bound to
influence the question in favor of
federal regulation, now that they
possess the ballot and can wield an
immense power at the polls and in
our halls of legislation.
In reference to the amendment,
however, the writer has a suggestion. He believes in its wisdom but
questions the propriety of its phraseology to accomplish the desried ends.
The second part of the amendment
qualifies the first in that it reserves
to the states a certain concurrent
power of regulation and to that extent impairs the federal power which
to be effective should not merely be
partial but absolutely complete. This
objectionable clause, in other words,
gives to the states the power to
abolish as a cause for divorce any
cause enumerated by the Federal
Statutes. Naturally the states will
legislate as they now do, some liberally, others strictly, according to
their own views of social expediency
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and in some, all the causes for divorce will be retained, while in
others all will be abolished and such
action will immediately reduce our
federal legislation to a heteroqueous
system, the one chief argument now
being used in its support. And apart
from this difficulty it is desirable for
the sake of certainty that federal
power be exclusive in the United

States, and not concurrent with the
states. A power is either national or
local; it should not be, and cannot be,
both combined, and be expected to be
beneficially exercised. Hence it is
submitted that the proviso is destructive and subverts the whole purpose
of the amendment. It should be expunged before its submission to the
states.
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ALUMNI
(Contributing Section)
MARINE INSURANCE LAW AND ADMIRALTY
By
Lester B. Donahue, Esq., Ph.D., of the New York Bar
Law schools exist for a definite
purpose. This purpose has been erroneously understood in many quarters, to embrace the teaching of law.
The true purpose of such schools,
however, is to teach its students to
think legally,-that is because no
man knows the law in its entirety and
widest significance.
Basic principles, underlying the field of law, may
be thoroughly understood and appreciated as principles, but the application of these principles to a given
group of facts, requires the aid and
interpretation of decisions of our
courts, hence the impossibility of all
questions of law, evidenced in decisions of courts, remaining forever in
the res judicata class. Court decisions are subject to change and frequently upon what appears to be an
insignificant, item of difference in a
group of facts; in other words, we
sometimes find different decisions of
our courts in cases where there has
been apparently an identity of facts.
This is so because it is next to impossible to have two groups of facts
absolutely identical. One finds this
situation succinctly expressed in the
Roman adage "Quando duo faciunt
idem, non est idem."
The law school functions effectively when it graduates a student who
can think legally and who can find
support of his appreciation of the relation of facts to legal principles in
court decisions. The curriculum of
a law school is ordained advisedly to
meet the needs of the student and to
develop the student in a normal man-

ner. To this end the course of study
is divided into years and subjects. Division of subjects in any educational
curriculum is, in the large, arbitrary,
and yet without such division, the
task of training a student becomes
exceedingly difficult, if at all possible.
Subjects assigned for the first year
law student are not entirely distinct,
separate and independent from subjects subsequently undertaken in the
second, third and fourth years of
the school curriculum. Each and every subject presented at any period
of the student's law school course,
are part of the great and general
subject of law. Grouping of subjects for the advanced law school
student is made for the purpose of
preparing the student for the field of
business into which he shall shortly
enter. In the business field we find
also grouping and classification of
subjects. Hence it frequently follows
that after a few years of preliminary
labor, the young attorney enters the
field of a specialty in his law practice.
He may become a real estate attorney; he may deal with bonds and investments; he may be interested in
wills and estates; he may become the
confidential adviser of a large corporation, or he may enter the banking, shipping or insurance field. In
any one of the specialties with which
the attorney may be interested, he
will find much to learn from the
standpoint of a practical business
man. That attorney functions best
in the interest of his clients when he
is able to appreciate the business
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point of view of his client. Appreciation of the business point of view
of the client means that the attorney
must have a practical knowledge of
that business. Hence it is, for example, that the field of patent law is
restricted to those attorneys who
have become skilled in the field of
mechanics, electricity and the like.
The object of this paper is concerned particularly with the needs
of the law student for instruction in
the particular field of marine insurance and admiralty law, is taught
in but few of our law schools. The
two subjects form the field of a specialty which has obtained rapid
strides in the last quarter of a century. It is the writer's contention
that these subjects, marine insurance
and admiralty, should be made part
of one course in the law school, and
should be taught in all law schools,
whether such schools are located on
the coast, near inland waters or in
the interior. No law school can
rightly assume the point of view that
it need not teach admiralty or marine insurance because, forsooth, that
school is located at a great distance
from a port. Graduates . of law
schools do not remain to continue
practice within the shadow of the
schools-they frequently settle at
points far distant from the schools,
and should not be handicapped by
limitations placed on the courses because of the fact that the school is
iot located near a seaport, and therefore not interested in maritime problems.
All commerce deals inter alia with
questions of shipping and insurance.
The attorney who best understands
such problems is the one who knows
the field of marine insurance and admiralty law. It might be said that
the well equipped admiralty attorney

is not dependent upon a knowledge of
marine insurance for the success of
his practice. This view, however, is
not supported by experience. The
owner of the vessel, or the shipper of
merchandise, undertakes to insure
his interest against loss; and where
ships are moved and merchandise
carried, there insurance is found to
exist, and the rules of maritime law
applied. Admiralty law of today is
practiced in the shadow of marine
insurance. Marine insurance and
admiralty are two of the oldest subjects known to commerce. They date
back many centuries, and each has
a development peculiar to itself, and
yet related.
The marine. insprance policy is
one of great antiquity, with peculiar
phraseology, each of the terms of
which policy has been accorded a
legal value by innumerable decisions
of courts. The policy' deals w"ith
matters which pertain to risks of the
sea. The peculiarity of the technical
terms used calls for particular study
and attention. Hull or cargo problems of marine insurance companies
come continually to the desk of the
marine attorney. As a rule, underwriters seek the advice of the attorney who is well equipped to advise
with reference to marine insurance,
and who is also well acquainted with
maritime law. This is because of
the fact that in event of underwriter's liability and a payment under
the policy, the underwriter is subrogated to the rights of the assured,
and upon such basis, the underwriter
proceeds against the third party for
collection of the loss or an adjudication of the damage which has come
to the assured through the many
known casualties of the sea. It is
a fact that but very few attorneys
are able to interpret a marine insur-
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ance policy. Few also are able to go
forward in accordance with the well
established principles of maritme
law in taking the necessary action to
recover for loss or damage to hull or
cargo.
The law and practice of marine insurance admiralty is sui generis, and
the attorney who functions best in
this field is the one who is thoroughly
acquainted not only with the policy
of insurance, but with the theory of
underwriting; survey of cargo; and
a knowledge of the many features of
maritime law. Fire, life casualty
and other forms of insurance, are as
different from marine insurance as
day is from night. It is possible to
classify and standaraize fire insurance. This is due to the fact that
property on shore is largely stationary and is well protected by local ordinance against fire; by building law
requirements, and other precautionary measures. Marine insurance, on
the other hand, covers property that
is moving at sea-either the hull itsblf or cargo that is carried in ships
subject to the changing conditions of
wind and storm and conditions in
foreign territories, and carried by
ships commanded by men who are
for the time being beyond the actual
control and supervision of their employers. No one ship ever meets the
same conditions on two successive
voyages, and it is a daily occurence in
marine insurance circles that questions of general average, particular
average, stranding, salvage, barratry, theft and pilferage come up for
instant decision. One of the most important questions dealing with marine insurance is that of seaworthiness. This one question presents a
field of amazing interest and of extraordinary peculiarity. The attor-

ney who deals with this question
must have a definite knowledge and
appreciation of the various kinds and
classes of vessels, the classification
bureaux which pass upon seaworthiitcss, and the relation between underwith the issuance of a policy covering such item. All of the casualties
which may come to the hull or cargo
while water borne, and casualties
which fall within a field influenced
by the rules of maritime law. This
is so not only with reference to the
interpretation of the underwriter's
liability in the policy, but also true
with reference to the underwriter's
ability to recoup his loss against the
third parties. Let us take a typical
illustration.
We will suppose that "A", the
owner of hull, insures his interest in
this hull with "B", an underwriter.
Subsequently, the ship proceeds to
sea, and while en route for a foreign
port, meets with a terrific hurricane, making it necessary to jettison
part of the cargo. The ship, thereafter proceeding on her course,
comes into collision with another
steamer, causing considerable damage to the hull of the assured boat.
Thereafter, the ship proceeds on her
voyage until a few hundred miles of
her destination when her shaft
breaks; being unable to proceed under her own steam, she sends out
signals of distress, is picked up by a
passing steamer, and towed to port.
On arrival in port, it is found, upon
examination, that considerable of her
cargo is damaged. This recital is not
an unusual one, and the reader can
well appreciate the important questions which are presented as the result of this voyage. The underwriter immediately seeks to determine his liability by a careful exam-
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ination of his policy. He will seek
legal assistance to determine questions of seaworthiness, general average, collision clauses, salvage and liability of ship for damage to cargo.
The attorney whose advice is solicited in connection with the above recital, is required to make a careful
examination of, the policy to work
out the liability of underwriter, and
thereafter will be concerned with an
examination of the ship's papers, her
certificate of classification; personnel
of her officers and crew, and an examination of her bill of lading. He
will also examine the entries of the
log of the master to obtain a recital
of the facts with reference to the jettisoning of cargo and the collision
and salvage instances. General average bonds will have to be procured,
survey of the ship undertaken, and
examination of the alleged damaged
cargo to be made by competent surveyors. The final completion and
settlement of all the preliminaries
arising out of this recital will take
some time, and in the solution of
such preliminaries the attorney must
be well equipped with a knowledge of
the intricacies of marine insurance
and admiralty law. He must know
both fields, otherwise he is not the
man to function either in the interest of the assured alone, nor in the
interest of underwriter.
As marine insurance is now taught
in our law schools, it is but one item
of the general subject of insurance,
whether the same be taught with the
use of the text book, or by the case
system. There is, therefore, little
opportunity afforded the student to
become well acquainted with the
principles underlying the study of
marine insurance and no opportunity
at all of becoming acquainted with

the various documents which are
used in connection with marine insurance, and which, of themselves,
requires much attention and study to
be properly appreciated and understood. Admiralty law has assumed
a more important status in the curricula of the schools in which it is
taught, and yet this subject matter,
as prepared for the attention of the
student, is by no means established
as an item in the curricula in its true
importance. In schools where the
case system is used, the one case book
on admiralty is that of Ames. This
book deals with questions of jurisdiction of the courts; subject matter
included within the jurisdiction;
bottomry bonds; respondentia, maritime liens; charter parties; salvage
and the like.
Admiralty, as practiced, even in
it's leading features, embraces a
sphere far more exhaustive than that
suggested by Ames' case book. From
a practical standpoint, admiralty law
includes within its scope not only the
big questions of jurisdiction, bottomry bonds, liens, etc., but questions
relating to the purchase and sale of
vessels; the documenting of such
vessels under their respective flags;
the rules and regulations concerning
the ship's papers; employment and
the rights and duties of the crew;
the charter of the ship; questions of
freight and matters dealing with the
loading and discharging of the ship.
Further, there are the real big questions coming within the scope of the
Harter Act, the Limited Liability Act
and similar questions arising out of
other Federal statutes dealing with
ships and shipping. One must not
forget also the many peculiar points
of law dealing with the charter party.
This document, originally simple in
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its construction, has now grown in
extent and nature, so that it requires
one who is an expert to decipher its
scope and meaning, and to spell out
the rights and liabilities created by
virtue of its terms and conditions.
Bills of lading, evidencing as they do
receipt of goods, contract of carriage
and ownership of merchandise, form
an important part of the work of the
admiralty attorney. There are hundreds of bills of lading now in use,
each with clauses common to others,
and yet each liaving particular
clauses of its own. These bills of
lading, or at least the ones in common use, must be known in their entirety and understood as a necessary
and integral part of the work of the
marine attorney.
In law schools where admiralty is
taught, very little attention is given
to the question of collision. This is
really one of the most prolific sources
of litigation within the field of admiralty law. Ability to handle such
matters requires, as a condition precedent, a working knowledge of the
so-called "Rules of the Road." These
rules govern the movements of ships
not only in what is known as inland
and coastwise waters, but also while
such ships are on the high seas. The
attorney who does not know what
these rules are and what they signify, is necessarily incompetent to pass
upon the question of merit in the
matter of collision. The rules are
not difficult-to the limited amount
of knowledge which one must have
of navigation can easily be procured
-and yet, apparently there has been
no time allotted in the few schools in
which admiralty is taught, to give
to the students the working materials
with which to attempt solutions in
the field mentioned. True it is that

law schools teach one to think legally, but it is not a trespass upon the
function of the law school to intermingle with this theory practical
elements which will give theory an
attractive setting. In the writer's
experience, no practical illustrations
are made in law schools which handle the subject of admiralty with reference to points so vitally interesting
to the student who later becomes the
practitioner, viz: the principal parts
of a ship with which the admiralty
attorney must become acquainted,
the "rules of the road" which govern the movement of ships and the
working knowledge of charts, ship's
papers, protests and surveys, with
each of which documents the student
will spend much of his time as a
practitioner in working out various
problems. Practice and procedure
in the admiralty courts are not made
a part of the subject of admiralty
taught in our schools, and a knowledge of this branch of the law must
be acquired by the attorney after he
enters upon his life's work. In many
ways this apparently in justifiable,
and yet it seems to the writer that
with a small portion of the time allotted for the course in admiralty,
much assistance could be rendered
the student in outlining the peculiar
practice and procedure in our admiralty courts. This outline would at
least prepare the student for what
was to follow, and would enable him
to eliminate many embarrassing errors which he is bound to make because he leaves the law school, in
many instances, carrying a deckload
of theory, with nothing of a practical nature to support this load.
There is, undoubtedly, no field in the
practice of law that is more interesting and constructive than the field
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within which functions the theory States, was found upon the lakes and
and practice of marine insurance and inland waters. The World's conadmiralty law.
Surprising as it flict, however, has changed that situseems, but little time and attention is ation, and we now find the ocean tongiven to these subjects in the law nage of the United States reaching
schools. It is the writer's contention to enormous heights. With a readthat they can be made interesting and justment of our shipping problems,
attractive and profitable with a prop- in Congress, this tonnage will, it is
er combination of the two. From a hoped, be maintained and developed.
material standpoint, the incentive This tonnage, of itself bespeaks a
for this combination is obvious, and need for a definite program with refit lies in the fact that renumeration erence to instruction in the law of
in the practice of marine insurance marine insurance and admiralty in
and admiralty law is most attractive. our law schools.
The life of a nation depends; among
The writer submits that no well
where there is commerce, there is
other things, upon its commerce, and established law school should be withwhere there is commerce, there is out these courses, and where these
bound to be goods in transit, and the courses exist, they should not be
situation of the United States is such taught separately, but should become
that this transit must be, in the na- integral parts of one subject which,
ture of things, not only land car- as has been stated, is not only vitally
riage but also a carriage which re- interesting from a legal standpoint
quires the use of ships. Prior to the but also extremely profitable to the
war, the major portion of the ton- attorney who is well equipped to
nage documented in the United carry on the work of this field.

POINTS, PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL, POLITICAL
About the Alumni
Leo Ward, '20, has successfully
passed the California bar.
Nobert Baglin, '19, has just been
admitted to the New York bar.
Hon. John W. Eggman, LL. B.,
has returned to Ft. Wayne, Indiana,
where he has opened offices for the
resumption of his practice of law in
his old home city. Judge Eggman
left the bench of the Allen Circuit
Court and went to Lafayette. From
there he entered the K. of C. War
Work and was for a time in France.
We are glad to note his re-entry in
law practice at Fort. Wayne.
George Windoffer, LL. B., '17, who
has been serving as Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of Madison County,

Indiana, has just been re-appointed to the position. We are glad to
note this recognition as evidence of
George's ability and success in the
practice of his profession. Continued
success to you, George.
Edward C. McMahon, LL.B., '20,
was a isitor at the Hoynes College of
Law. "Mac" has been keeping office for the speaker of the Indiana
House of Representatives, and since
the adjournment of the legislature
he has returned to his home at Anderson, Indiana. Mac tells us that
he believes he would do more in the
practice of law if he looked older.
Keep at it, old boy, you'll grow older
by and by.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
Gus Van Wonterghen, LL. B., '19,
has a government position in Washington, in the income taxe department.
The Schultz murder trial in the
Superior Court in South Bend, is attracting attention of the students of
the Law School. All the lawyers for
both the State and the defendant are
N. D. men. Prosecutor Floyd Jelli:son and former Prosecuting Attorney, Sam'l Schwartz together with
Vincent Jones, iepresent the State
of Indiana, while William M. McT'iery and Walter McInery are for
the defendant. These men are graduates of the College of Law of Notre
Dame University.
Francis J. Murphy, LL. B., '20,
is a candidate for the nomination for
City Judge in Lafayette, Indiana.
His campaign card announcing his
candidacy reached the Law School
recently and was tacked to the bulletin board. Needless to say we are
all for him.
-Lorenzo Glascott, LL.B., '19, is a
candidate for the Republican nomination for City Judge of Michigan
City, Indiana. Here is voting for
you, Lorenzo. The Law School is
glad to hear of your prominence and
success.
We have just been informed by
Eugene Hines, one of our law students, that our old friend, Hugh E.
Carroll, LL. B., '16, is a candidate
for the nomination of the Citizens
Party for the City Judge of East Chicago, Indiana, with excellent prospects of nomination and election.
Good, Hugh, you'll succeed.
J. Elmer Peak, LL. B., '12, has announced himself a candidate for the
Democratic nomination for City
Judge in South Bend. Why not our
esteemed friend and fellow alumni
of Notre Dame.
A card announced the removal of

Belcher & Conner law offices to the
James Bldg., 37 West Broad St.
Nester, LL. B., '20, will office with
them.
A LETTER
March 31, 1921.
Hon. F. J. Vurpillat,
Dean of the College of Law,
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
Dear Judge Vurpillat:
This afternoon's mail included a
copy of the February issue of the
Notre Dame Law Reporter. And incidentially the thought came into my
mind that I have not paid my subscription. I am enclosing a check
t ocover such payment.
Judge, as you undoubtedly know,
I have been in the practice of law
here since October 15th of last year.
Everything is coming fine. I have
had the good luck to include in my
work much supreme court practice.
Needless to say that I have "mopped
up the court room floor several
times" as Judge Farabaugh often declared to be one of the experiences of
the young lawyer.
Were I to give advice to the fellows now in the law school it would
be that which you have always advocated-study, practice and procedure. The time to study is during the
years in College. Time cannot be
had in the business world. Such has
been my experience.
I plan to be at Notre Dame for the
commencement exercises in June and
I certainly will be glad to get back
to the school for at least a visit. Give
my best regards to Judge Farabaugh
Professor Tiernan, Professor Costello, Professor Frederickson, and all
of my old friends at the school and
in South Bend.
Very respectfully yours.
Francis J. Clohessy, '20.
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DIRECTORY
Of the Notre Dame Law Alumni
In Forwarding Business to a Distant Point Remember Your
Fellow Alumni Appearing in This List.
BuddARIZONA
Arthur B. Hughes
TusconCampusJames V. Robins,
Francis T. Walsh
107 Melrose St.
Chicago-ARKANSAS
Francis O'Shaughenessy,
Little Rock10 S. LaSalle St.
Aristo Brizzolara,
Hugh O'Neill,
217 E. Sixth St.
Conway Bldg.
Charles W. Bachman,
CALIFORNIA
836 W. Fifty-fourth St.
Los AngelesJohn Jos. Cook,
Terence Cocgrove,
3171 Hudson Ave.
1131 Title Insurance Bldg.
James V. Cunningham,
of
Mott,
G.
John
1610 Conway Bldg.
Mott & Cross,
J. Daly,
Hugh
Citizens National Bank Bldg.
614 Woodland Park
Michael J. McGarry,
Leo J. Hassenauer,
530 Higgins Bldg.
1916 Harris Trust Bldg.
Leo B. Ward,
William C. Henry,
4421 Willowbrook Ave.
7451 Buell Ave.
San FranciscoJohn S. Hummer,
Alphonsus Heer,
710-69 W. Washington St.
1601 Sacramento St.
Albert M. Kelly,
2200 Fullerton Ave.
COLORADO
Daniel L. Madden,
TellurideConway Building
James Hanlon
Clement C. Mitchell,
69 W. Washington St.
CONNECTICUT
William J. McGrath,
Bridgpport648 N. Carpenter St.
Donato Lepore,
J. McManus,
Thos.
,645 E. Washington Ave.
5719 Michigan Ave.
Raymond W. Murray,
John F. O'Connell,
784 Noble Ave.
155 N. Clark St.
HartfordP. O'Hara,
Joseph
James Curry and Thos. Curry, of
1060 The Rookery
Curry & Curry,
Clifford O'Sullivan,
D'Esops Bldg., 647 Main St.
2500 E. Eeventy-fourth St.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Stephen F. Reardon,
405 Peoples Life Bldg.
WashingtonFrancis X. Rydzewski,
Timothy Ansberry,
8300 Burley Ave.
208-12 Southern Bldg.
Delbert D. Smith,
GEORGIA
3966 Lake Park Ave.
Fred L. Steers,
Atlanta1350 First National Bank Bldg.
Fay Wood,
Max St. George,
225 E. Fourth St.
108 S. LaSalle St.
ILLINOIS
DecaturAuroraWilliam P. Downey,
110 N. Water St.
Robert Milroy,
113 Fox St.
DixonBataviaJohn Sherwood Dixon,
Joseph Feldott
East OttowaBelvidereHarry F. Kelly, of
Kelly & Kelly,
Stephen F. McGonigle,
Eastwood
1011 Whitney St.
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East St. LouisJoseph B. McGlynn and Daniel McGlynn,
of McGlynn& McGlynn,
120 N. Main St.
ElginThos. J. Hoban,
16 Chicago St.
Frank A. McCarthy,
18-14 Elgin National Bank Bldg.
Lawrence McNerney,
Home Bank Bldg.
William Perce,
Opera House Bldg.
Elmer Tobin,
18 Chicago St.
GalesburgHon. Charles Craig
HoopestonGeorge E. Harbert,
827 E. Penn St.
HowardPaul J. Donovan
KewaneeThomas J. Welch,
Savings Bank Bldg.
LodaDaniel P. Keegan
MendotaJohn W. Dubbs,
Washington St.
MolinePeter M ersman,
205 Reliance Bldg.
Matthew McEniry,
408 Peoples Bank Bldg.
Mt. CarmelMartin E. Walter,
119 W. Seventh St.
OttowaRobert C. Carr, of
Johnson & Carr,
Central Life Bldg.
John E. Cassidy,
322 E. Superior St.
James J. Conway,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
Daniel C. Curtis,
519 Guthrie St.
Thomas O'Meara,
Route 27
Thomas O'Meara,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
PeoriaGeorge Sprenger,
Jefferson Bldg.
PoloRobert Bracken
RobinsonWilliam E. Bradbury,
RochelleThomas F. Healy
First National Bank Bldg.

Rock IslandFrancis A. Andrews,
631 Fifth St.
SpringfieldThomas Masters
Albert C. Schliff,
918 N. Sixth St.
StreatorElmer J. Mohan,
Route No. 3
WoodstockPaul Donovan,
Hoy Block
INDIANA
AndersonEdward C. McMahon,
2004 Fletcher St.
Philip O'Neill,
511-13-15 Union Bldg.
CrawfordsvilleJustin J. Molony,
706 Binford St.
ElkhartJames S. Dodge,
229-31 Monger Bldg.
Wilmer O'Brien,
325-6 Monger Bldg.
Robert Proctor,
201-5 Monger Bldg.
East ChicagoHugh E. Carroll
Fort WayneWilliam P. Breen, of
Breen & Morris,
Peoples Trust Bldg.
Joseph Haley,
202 Shoaff Bldg.
Cornelius B. Hayes,
New Hayes Hotel
Thomas A. Hayes,
501 Bass Block
Frank M. Hogan, of
Colerick & Hogan,
Cor. Court and Berry Sts.
Emmett A. Rohyans,
2725 S. Calhoun St.
Lawrence Stephan,
1431 Hugh St.
FrankfortEarl F. Gruber,
Dinwidie Bldg.
GaryHenry B. Snyder and Patrick Maloney,
of Snyder & Maloney,
738 Broadway
IndianapolisJames E. Deery,
316-324 Law Bldg.
Paul J. Smith,
2024 Central Ave.
KokomoGeorge F. Windoffer,
324 W. Jefferson St.
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LafayetteFrancis J. Murphy,
430 S. Third St.
Chas. E. and Vincent Vaughan, of
Vaughan & Vaughan,
710-711 Lafayette Bldg.
John W. Eggeman,
800 N. Fourth St.
LaGrange-George D. McDonald,
114 Sixth Ave.
LintonHugh E. Carroll
MarionFred B. Mahaffey,
622 S. Brownson St.
Michigan CityLorenzo Glascott,
223 W. Tenth St.
James Kenefick,
Care T. M. J. and J. P. Kenefick
Louis Finski
MishawakaRalph Feig,
Mishawaka Trust Bldg.
John Schindler,
215 S. "Main St.
MontgomeryBernard Heffernan,
Route 4
McCordsvilleHarry Kelly
William H. Kelly
South BendLeo J. Cook,
410 Union Trust Bldg.
G. A. Farabaugh and
E. A. Fredrickson,
504 J. M. S. Bldg.
Samuel Feiwell,
404 Citizens Bank Bldg.
Charles Hagerty,
J. i. S. Bldg.
Vernon R. Helman,
R. F. D. 5, Box 18
Patrick Houlihan,
203 Title Bldg.
Arthur B. Hunter,
710 Portage Ave.
Floyd Pellison,
334-36 Farmers Trust Bldg.
Joseph J.Kovacs,
109 N. College St.
Arthur May,
811 J. M. S. Bldg.
Ernest Morris,
Farmers Trust Bldg.
Thomas D. Mott,
522 Farmers Trust Bldg.
William Mclnerny,
104 Summers Bldg.
William B. O'Neill,
406 Citizens Bank Bldg.

John E. Peak,
224-26 Farmers Trust Bldg.
George W. Sands,
211-12 Convervative Life Bldg.
Armand Schellinger,
415-16 Union Trust Bldg.
George Schock
Samuel Schwartz,
706 J. M. S. Bldg.
Edwin H. Sommerer,
125 N. Francis St.
Vincennes-Louis H. Hellert,
American Bank Bldg.
IOWA
CarrollJoseph J. Meyers,
201 Masonic Temple
Des MoinesWilliam J. Hynes,
504 Observatory Bldg.
DubuquePatrick J. Nelson,
200-6 Security Bldg.
Fort DodgeMichael F. Healy,
605-10 Snell Bldg.
Emmet P. Mulholland, and
Clement B. Mulholland,
300 Snell Bldg.
Ida GroveMatthew M. White
Iowa CityJohn J. Ney
LenoxEugene F. McEniry
Mason CityJohn D. Wilson
MuscatineRichard B. Swift,
504 Laurel Bldg.
NewtonRalph Bergman
PrestonHarry Gqdes
WaverlyHumphrey L. Leslie,
204 S. State St.
KANSAS
Kansas CityRussell C. Hardy,
812 N. Fifth St.
Thomas V. Holland,
1623 Central Ave.
Theodore J. Lyons,
716 Pyle St.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
KENTUCKY
LebanonSamuel J. Spaulding,
Box 585
Samuel T. Spaulding
OwensboroAlbert Oberst,
Masonic Bldg.
LOUISIANA
New OrleansPatrick E. Burke,
307 Camp
Thomas V. Craven,
305 Wells Fargo Bldg.
MASSACHUSETTS
BostonWilliam P. Higgins,
730 Tremont Bldg.
SpringfieldWilliam J. Granfield
Court Square, Theatre Bldg.
MICHIGAN
DetroitHarry Cullen,
1226-30 Dime Bank Bldg.
Daniel Foley,
1626 Penobscot
Thomas A. McLaughlin,
76 Belmont Ave.
Louis C. Wurzer and F. Henry Wrzer,
Wurzer & Wurzer,
910 Majestic Bldg.
FlintVincent D. Ryan,
910 Flint P. Smith Bldg.
Grand RapidsJoseph Riley,
236 Valley Ave., N. W.
JacksonJames G. Henley,
117 W. Pearl
LansingMaurice D. Kirby,
310 Bauch Bldg.
MINNESOTA
CrookstonEdmund E. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Joseph H. Sylvester,
124 State St.
DuluthThomas McKeon,
817 Torrey Bldg.
Minneapoli-Edward F. Barrett,
1774 Gerard Ave., S.
St. CloudGeorge L. Murphy,
340 Seventh Ave., S.

MISSOURI
Kansas CityLeonard M. Carroll,
3117 Flora Ave.
Drexel L. Duffy,
201 Linwood Blvd.
Llewellyn D. James,
323 W. Armour Blvd.
John R. Meyers,
310 Ridge Bldg.
St. Louis-John L. Corley,
Fullerton Bldg.
MONTANA
ButteTimothy Downey,
21 Center St.
Frank C. Walker,
825 W. Quartz St.
John Ward,
28 E. Quartz St.
GalenAlbert Galen,
Galen Block
MaltaWilliam McGarry
NEBRASKA
Wahoo-Frank Kirchman,
Box 337
NEVADA
ElkoEdmund Carville,
Farrington Bldg.
Reno-Michael Diskin
NEW JERSEY
PlainfieldAndrew L. McDonough,
Babcock Bldg.
RockawayDaniel P. Murphy,
Wriebands Corporation
NEW MEXICO
Las VegasThomas V. Truder,
East Las Vegas
NEW YORK
AlbanyT. Paul McGannon,
Care Office Attorney-General
BuffaloMax G. Kazus,
459 Amherst St.
Geneva-Francis T. McGrain,
9 State St.
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RochesterDaniel J. Quinlan,
47 Exchange St.
New York CitySimeon Flanagan,
Care John J. Sullivan,
203 Broadway
Peter McElligott,
428 W. Twenty-fourth St.
PalmyraHarold P. Burke
WaverlyFrancis J. Clohessy,
455 Fulton St.
NORTH DAKOTA
MinotGeorge McGee
Park RiverJacob V. Birder
RugbyThomas Toner,
Main St.
OHIO
AkronClarence May,
427 Second National Bank Bldg.
Walter McCourt,
365 S. Main St.
CincinnatiErnest DuBrue,
835 Beecher Ave.
Cleveland1852 Ansell Road
Stanley B. Cofall,
Harry Miller,
Grasselli Chemical Co.
Walter Miller,
318 Leader News Bldg.
James O'Hara,
303 Park Bldg.
Hugh O'Neill,
1934 Euclid Ave.
ColumbusDonald Hamilton,
801-8 Huntington Bank Bldg.
DaytonThomas Ford,
127 Maple St.
Joseph B. Murphy,
618 Dayton Savings & Trust Bldg.
John C. Shea,
Schwind Bldg.
HamiltonMichael O'Burns,
338 S.Second St.
LancasterMichael A. Dougherty,
343 E. Walnut
Harry P. Nester,
156 E. Chestnut St.

LimaFrancis W. Durbin,
607 Law Bldg.
MaumeePeter Al. Ragan
NapoleonEdwin C. Donnelly,
827 Haley Ave.
SanduskyEdmund Savord,
Room 3, Sloan Block
Toledo-Robert Dederich,
2619 Scottwood
Albert J. Kranz,
116 Nicholas Bldg.
Edwin J. Lynch,
642 Nicholas Bldg.
James T. McMahon,
2916 Collingwooa Ave.
John B. McMahon,
940 Spitzer Bldg.
Arthur W. Ryan,
366 W. Central Ave.
OKLAHOMA
TulsaHarold R. Delaney,
1412 S. Boulder St.
Leo Holland
Patrick M. Malloy,
1115 Denver St., P. 0. Box 1957
OREGON
AstoriaJames L. Hope,
312-15 Spexarth Bldg.
IndependenceFrancis W. Kirkland
PortlandRoscoe Hurst,
1406 Yeon Bldg.
Frank Lonergan,
816 Electric Bldg.
Roger Sinnott,
Chamber of Commerce
WoodburnStephen Scollard
PRNNSYLVANIA
HomesteadJohn J. Brislan,
400 McClure St.
JeanetteJohn W. Ely,
601 Germania Bank Bldg.
JohnstownJohn C. Larkin,
322 Wood Ave.
PhiladelphiaJames P. Fogarty,
1607-08 Finance Bldg.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
Edward Gallagher,
301 E. Lehigh Ave.
George Hanhauser,
401 Market St.
PittsburghDaniel C. Dillon,
811 Frick Bldg.
RydalEdward Britt
SOUTH DAKOTA
ChamberlainNicholas Furlong
EdgemontWilliam A. Guilfoyle
HowardTheodore Feyder
TENNESSEE
MemphisCharles McCauley,
383 N. Second St.
TEXAS
BeaumontHarry P. Barry,
Stark Bldg.
SintonBryan Odem,
Sinton State Bank
James F. Odem
WASHINGTON
CentraliaWilliam Cameron,
304 W. Plum St.
WISCONSIN
FennimoreRalph J. Lathrop
George F. Frantz, of
Clementson & Frantz,
Gravenbrock Bldg.
Green BayJohn Diener,
Room 1, Parmentier Bldg.
MilwaukeeFrank Burke,
904 Pabst Bldg.

Joseph E. Dorais,
Belvidere Apt., 58
Thomas C. Kelly,
66 Eighth St.
Chgauncey Yockey,
514 Wells Bldg.
Edward Yockey,
Merchants & Farmers Bank Bldg.
NeelsvilleGeorge A. Frantz
PlymouthGilbert P. Hand,
105 Milwaukee St.
RacineGrover F. Miller,
1116 College Ave.
SpartaJohn P. Doyle,
508 S.Water St.
SuperiorSherman May,
2016 Hammond St.
CUBA
CeinfuegosAndrew Castille,
Box 505
MIEXICO
Mexico CityAlfonso Anaya,
Qa, Apartado 52
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Beinaton UnionBernardo Lopez
ManilaJose Manuel Gonzales
Turlac, TarlacJose Urquico
Misamia ProvinceEmilio Aranus
SorsogenDoroteo Amador

